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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change has become an increasingly urgent crisis. The rapidly 
warming climate has already produced impacts that scientists had not 
expected for years to come.1 While policymakers may once have thought
 1. Eric Holthaus, The Point of No Return: Climate Change Nightmares Are Already 
Here, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the­
point-of-no-return-climate-change-nightmares-are-already-here-20150805 [https://perma.cc/
5XWW-6JQ8]; Ian Johnston, Climate Scientists Expected ‘Nothing Like’ This Year’s Record-
Breaking Global Temperatures, INDEPENDENT (July 27, 2016), http://www.independent. 
Rising Faster Than Expected in Some Parts of the United States, Especially in the 
Northeast, NAT’L SCI. NEWS (Jan. 21, 2017), http://naturalsciencenews.com/2017/01/21/
the-sea-level-is-rising-faster-than-expected-in-some-parts-of-the-united-states-especially-in­
the-northeast/ [https://perma.cc/6YES-378G]; Lauren Morello, Polar Ice Sheets Melting
Faster Than Predicted, CLIMATE WIRE (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/ 
co.uk/environment/climate-change-global-warming-record-temperatures-nothing-like-shocked- 
2016-a7157891.html [https://perma.cc/9ELX-24NE]; Joanna Lawrence, The Sea Level Is
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humanity could wait decades to substantially reduce global anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions, scientific studies now underscore the necessity
of immediate emissions peaks followed by deep drops over the next two 
to three decades.2 Multiple studies advocate for solutions that involve
some form of rapid decarbonization,3 a transition to a carbon-free energy 
system,4 or “carbon-negative” strategies to remove carbon dioxide and other 
long-lived greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.5 Although scientists 
may disagree about which solutions will be most effective, the consensus 
view is that climate change requires immediate transformative action. 
In an attempt to respond to the scientific urgency, many governments
around the globe have enacted a range of policies and strategies to mitigate
climate change and transition away from fossil fuels. Parties to the Paris 
Agreement have committed to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
stories/1059946187 [https://perma.cc/THR8-U87D], reprinted in Lauren Morello, Polar 
Ice Sheets Melting Faster Than Predicted, SCI.AM. (Mar. 9, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.
com/article/polar-ice-sheets-melting-faster-than-predicted/ [https://perma.cc/2PD2-KG5Z];
Anne C. Mulkern, Northern Hemisphere Snowpack Likely to Shrink Faster Than Previously 
Thought—Study, CLIMATE WIRE (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/ 
stories/1059972412 [https://perma.cc/C23K-XBDN], reprinted in Anne C. Mulkern, Northern 
Hemisphere Snowpack Likely to Shrink Faster, SCI. AM. (Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/northern-hemisphere-snowpack-likely-to-shrink-faster/ [https://
perma.cc/YSJ4-STL9]; Zoe Tabary, Scientists Caught Off-Guard by Record Temperatures 
Linked to Climate Change, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. NEWS (July 26, 2016), http://news. 
trust.org/item/20160726133558-a7f25/ [https://perma.cc/3PGY-MQUQ]; see, e.g., Niina 
Heikkinen, Scientists Warn That Warming’s Effects on Oceans are ‘More Severe’ Than 
Predicted, CLIMATEWIRE (July 7, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/ 
1060021345 [https://perma.cc/22WZ-J9FP].
2. See infra Part II. 
3. Pathways to deep decarbonization: 2015 report, SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLUTIONS
NETWORK (Dec. 2015), http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ 
DDPP_2015_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H4N-6F6H] (noting that United Nations
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commissioned SDSN to “mobilize scientific and technical
expertise from academia, civil society, and the private sector to support practical problem 
solving for sustainable development at local, national, and global scales.”); id.
4. Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and Sunlight 
(WWS) All-Sector Energy Roadmaps for the 50 United States, 8 ENERGY & ENVTL. SCI. 
2093 (2015), http://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/USStatesWWS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HSS7-URM3].
5. James Hansen et al., Young People’s Burden: Requirement of Negative CO2
Emissions (Oct. 4, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.earth-syst-dynam-discuss.
net/esd-2016-42/esd-2016-42.pdf [https://perma.cc/529D-YRWG]; Klaus S. Lackner et al.,
The Urgency of the Development of CO2 Capture from Ambient Air, 109 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 13156 (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/109/33/13156.full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SL8M-VAK2].
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to limit greenhouse gas emissions from 2020 through 2030.6 While their 
NDCs will not, at this point, ensure attainment of the Paris Agreement’s 
2°C goal7—and truth be told, the goal is a political compromise that does
not reflect current scientific understanding about the havoc that much warming
will likely wreak on the planet8—global efforts to mitigate climate change
will likely accelerate due to the Paris Agreement’s framework.
While the collective actions are currently insufficient to maintain a
stable climate, some nations have undertaken far more aggressive actions 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and their use of fossil fuels, breaking 
a trail for others to follow. Countries like Denmark and Sweden have
announced goals to fully transition their energy systems away from fossil 
fuels by 2050 and to lower greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% 
below 1990 levels by the middle of the century.9 While the United States
set a much weaker goal under the Obama Administration10—and, under 
the Trump Administration, commitment to the Paris Agreement specifically
6. Paris Agreement, art. 4, opened for signature (Apr. 22, 2016), http://unfccc. 
int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5B4U-HQJE] (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016); see also NDC Registry, 
U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/focus/ndc_registry/
items/9433.php [https://perma.cc/9489-PFBP] (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). 
7. Joeri Rogelj et al., Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep 
Warming Well Below 2 °C, 534 NATURE 631 (2016), http://www.nature.com/nature/
journal/v534/n7609/full/nature18307.html [https://perma.cc/6P9G-CQ3Y]; see also UNFCCC
Secretariat, Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/7 (Oct. 30, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7AB-9K54] (“[M]uch greater emission
reductions effort than those associated with the INDCs will be required in the period after 
2025 and 2030 to hold the temperature rise below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.”). 
8. Seth Borenstein et al., Odd Climate Math: The Difference Between 2 Degree
and 1.5 Degree Goal Much Bigger Than 0.5, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.usnews.
com/news/business/articles/2015/12/04/matter-of-degree-temperature-goal-in-climate-talks- 
an-issue [https://perma.cc/Z4CM-AWAQ] (discussing the political negotiations surrounding 
the adoption of a goal); Reto Knutti et al., A Scientific Critique of the Two-Degree Climate
Change Target, 9 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 13 (2016), http://www.nature.com/ngeo/journal/ 
v9/n1/full/ngeo2595.html [https://perma.cc/MNL2-EPDA]. 
9. Our Future Energy, DANISH GOV’T 3 (2011), https://stateofgreen.com/files/
download/387 [https://perma.cc/3PTE-W7LX]; Chloe Farand, Sweden Pledges to Cut All
Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 2045, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 4, 2017), http://www.independent. 
co.uk/news/science/sweden-pledges-greenhouse-gas-emissions-zero-2045-paris-agreement­
a7561111.html [https://perma.cc/VXA7-NDYX].
10. Nationally Determined Contribution: U.S., U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/ 
United%20States%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZNQ-YQ5W] (“[T]he United States intends to achieve an economy-
wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28 per cent below its 2005 
level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%.”).
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and action on climate change in general is very much in jeopardy11—on 
the sub-national level, many states continue to push aggressively to achieve
ambitious climate and clean energy goals.12 States have pursued a range 
of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from specific sectors
including the electricity, industrial, building, and transportation sectors.13 
Several states have dozens of climate and energy policies,14 signaling the
willingness of states to act.
This willingness to act, however, does not necessarily correspond to 
effective action. Indeed, despite the proliferation of climate and energy policies 
across the United States, greenhouse gas emissions have not dramatically
fallen,15 including in many states with seemingly robust climate and energy
policies. Oregon, a state known as a climate leader, provides a clear illustration 
of this dynamic. Oregon has enacted dozens of laws to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, including a statewide greenhouse gas emissions goal, multiple 
emissions standards aimed at reducing greenhouse gas releases from fossil 
fuels, a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) that requires the state’s large 
utilities to obtain at least 50% of their electricity from renewable resources 
by 2040, one of the leading energy efficiency programs in the country, 
and a range of state subsidies and tax incentives to promote renewable energy
 11. Coral Davenport, Diplomats Confront New Threat to Paris Climate Pact: Donald
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/us/politics/ 
trump-climate-change.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PS6G-KKC8].
12. See e.g., Phuong Le, Washington Governor says state won’t be deterred on
climate, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.kitsapsun.com/story/news/local/2017/01/26/washington­
governor-says-state-wont-deterred-climate/97103928/ [https://perma.cc/39XS-X45N] (last 
updated Jan. 26, 2017) (“Washington Gov. Jay Inslee said Thursday the state will move
forward with efforts to promote clean energy and tackle climate change despite ‘foolishness’ 
from President Donald Trump.”); Ken Silverstein, California Undercuts Trump’s Inauguration
With Aggressive Carbon Reduction Plan, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2017), http://www.globaladvisors. 
biz/inc-feed/20170121/california-undercuts-trumps-inauguration-with-aggressive-carbon­
reduction-plan/ [https://perma.cc/LN73-BPU5] (“By 2050, California hopes to have cut 
its greenhouse gas emissions by 80%.”).
13. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, DSIRE—N.C.
CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., http://www.dsireusa.org/ [https://perma.cc/82L7-WPLN] (last
visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
14. Id.
 15. U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report: 1990-2014, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/us-greenhouse-gas-inventory-report-1990­
2014 [https://perma.cc/CG2L-VL6Y] (last visited Apr. 15, 2017) (noting that data since
2005 shows a general decrease, but this is largely attributable to the economic recession, 
not government action); see, e.g., Kuishuang Feng et al., Drivers of the US CO2 Emissions 
1997–2013, 6 NATURE COMM. (2015), http://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms8714 [https:// 
perma.cc/JJ7G-BNGH].
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and energy conservation.16 If the sheer number of laws a state has enacted 
were determinative of a state’s actual climate and energy progress, Oregon 
should surely be in the lead. In reality, though, numerosity and effectiveness
are distinct. 
Despite twenty years of climate and energy policymaking, Oregon’s most 
recent greenhouse gas emissions inventory shows that Oregon’s greenhouse
gas emissions will be nearly 11 million metric tons above the state’s 2020
targets.17 At first glance, this shortfall could trigger despair, as it would
appear that meaningful progress on climate and clean energy eludes the
state—despite its formidable effort, good intentions, and relatively favorable
political landscape. However, such a conclusion is premature, for there is
much that Oregon can do to learn from its efforts, build on its successes, and
improve its approach going forward. Indeed, Oregon has a solid base of
human and intellectual capital in civil society, within the administrative
agencies, in local governments, and in the statehouse.18 Additionally, many 
of the major political and economic actors in Oregon are at least open to
the idea of a rapid transition to a clean energy economy.19 The state has also 
demonstrated a longstanding willingness to enact climate and energy policies, 
some of which have proven quite effective.20 
Nonetheless, the pressing scientific imperative of climate change 
compels a thorough and accurate examination of Oregon’s political and
legal shortcomings. Several climate and clean energy laws were poorly
designed or have been undermined by loopholes.21 Moreover, in some 
cases when potentially successful laws attracted media criticism, Oregon 
16. See infra Part IV.




18. See, e.g., Steve Law, Portland Wins International Award for Climate Change 
Efforts, PORTLAND TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2016), http://portlandtribune.com/sl/334818-214670­
portland-wins-international-award-for-climate-change-efforts [https://perma.cc/Y72Y-XDZD];
Twelve States From Different Countries Sign to be Climate Leaders, U.N. CLIMATE
CHANGE NEWS ROOM (May 20, 2015), http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/under-2­
mou-a-subnational-global-climate-leadership/ [https://perma.cc/5E8R-N84M].
19. See, e.g., Oregon Companies Act On Climate, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/ 
declaration/act/company-actions-on-climate/oregon-companies-act-on-climate [https://perma.
cc/REF6-F6XB] (last visited Apr. 15, 2017) (noting over 400 Oregon-based companies 
signed on to the Oregon Business Climate Declaration, a document stating that these business 
leaders support and promote the move to a clean energy economy); see also Oregon Business 
Climate Declaration: Tackling climate change is one of Oregon’s greatest economic opportunities
of the 21st Century (and it’s simply the right thing to do), CERES, https://www.ceres.org/ 
declaration/images/oregon-climate-declaration [https://perma.cc/DUR2-Y6L5] (last visited Apr. 
15, 2017) (providing a list of signatories of the Declaration). 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. Id. 
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responded with reactionary repeals or temporary quick fixes that fail to 
cure the perceived flaws without compromising climate goals.22 In short,
Oregon has become a consumer of quick fix23 and “fast policy” approaches
to climate mitigation and energy decarbonization. Like fast food or fast
fashion,24 the speed and convenience of quick fixes and fast policy often
come at the expense of quality.
According to Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, “fast policy” refers to the
accelerating rates of policy transfer around the globe “in which local
policy experiments exist in relation to near and far relatives, to traveling
models and technocratic designs, and to a host of financial, technical, social, 
and symbolic networks that invariably loop through centers of power and 
persuasion.”25 Although policy transfer is nothing new—governments 
have often modeled their own legislation off of their allies’ successful
policies—the term fast policy refers to the dynamic through which policies 
that embrace market-based programs have become increasingly mobile
due to the work of influential international and national institutions that 
promote neoliberal solutions to many social problems.26 Through a fast policy 
approach, a carefully tailored local policy will be discovered by international
or national experts, endorsed as a universal model for other governments 
to apply, and thus disseminated to other subnational and local governments,
without adequate consideration of the local factors that contributed to the 
prototype policy’s success.27 Governments on the receiving end of the 
expert institutions’ advice then often embrace the newly sanctioned policy 
without the technical analysis and careful local tailoring that marked policy 
22. See, e.g., Ted Sickinger, Oregon’s Business Energy Tax Credit Is Officially
Dead, But Its Liability Lives On, OREGONIAN (July 1, 2014), http://www.oregonlive.com/ 
business/index.ssf/2014/07/oregons_business_energy_tax_cr.html [https://perma.cc/U9WS-TQ42]
(exemplifying a critical media perspective on a controversial but strong renewable energy
incentive and celebrating the incentive’s demise).
23. Quick Fix, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
quick%20fix [https://perma.cc/7478-WEAJ] (last visited Apr. 15, 2017) (noting that a quick fix
is “an expedient usually temporary or inadequate solution to a problem.”).
24. For more on fast fashion, see, e.g., Zhai Yun Tan, What Happens When Fashion 
Becomes Fast, Disposable and Cheap?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 10, 2016), http://www. 
npr.org/2016/04/08/473513620/what-happens-when-fashion-becomes-fast-disposable-and­
cheap [https://perma.cc/VGR8-8VYN].
25. JAMIE PECK & NIK THEODORE, FAST POLICY: EXPERIMENTAL STATECRAFT AT 
THE THRESHOLDS OF NEOLIBERALISM xxxi (2015) (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at xxxi–xxxii.
 27. Id.
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transfers in the past.28 Several factors contribute to the proliferation of fast 
policy, including expanded internet connectivity; increased cooperation
between policy advocates; strategic messaging and analyses that often aim 
to support a chosen policy, rather than to evaluate whether a policy will 
perform as expected; and an institutional infrastructure that has become
dependent upon externally selected “best practices” and model rules, as
opposed to individually tailored solutions.29 While fast policy approaches 
can provide governments with useful regulatory templates to follow, they
can also produce flawed “solutions” to local problems.30 
Climate change and energy policies have many of the markings of fast 
policy. A number of climate and energy laws and regulations employ market-
based strategies, including emissions trading programs, carbon taxes, economic
incentives to promote renewable energy development, and several compliance 
instrument trading mechanisms designed to add flexibility to regulatory
mandates.31 Of these programs, the increasing use of emissions trading 
exemplifies the fast policy approach. The theory behind emissions trading 
emerged in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s and became a major 
regulatory tool through the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain program of 1990.32 
Despite several programmatic shortcomings, advocates of emissions trading 
successfully promoted the strategy at the international level through the 
Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms.33 Once enshrined in international 
law, emissions trading then became a favored policy in many domestic
and regional climate mitigation programs.34 Despite several problems with
emissions trading in practice, climate policy experts continue to advocate for
emissions trading, and local governments face continued pressure to enact
their own emissions trading programs. Many other climate and energy
regulations now also incorporate marketable compliance instruments into 
their regulatory framework.35 Indeed, climate and energy policymaking often 
focuses on developing and incentivizing new markets, rather than on using 
governmental powers to create comprehensive strategies and infrastructure
that will be necessary for decarbonization of the energy sector. Despite
 28. Id. 
29. Id. at 3–4. 
30. Id. at 234–35 (discussing ways that policy models form and constrain local policy
innovation); id. at 236 (discussing the importance of local cultivation of participatory 
budgeting and the ways in which fast policy discourages such local cultivation); see also
id. chs. 2–8 (examining case studies of fast policy). 
31. See infra Part III.B. 
32. Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the
Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 801-802 (2008). 
33. Id. at 804. 
34. Id. at 803–04. 
35. See infra Part III.B. 
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multiple implementation problems associated with market instruments,
international and national experts continue to push for their inclusion at 
the state and local level. Fast policy has thus come to dominate climate
and energy policy. 
Oregon exemplifies a state that has embraced quick fixes and fast climate
and energy policymaking.36 For Oregon, policy imports have become 
increasingly common, particularly from California’s expansive climate
and energy policy framework, which itself includes many internationally
sanctioned neoliberal policies.37 As can often happen with fast policy,
Oregon does not always tailor imported laws to local circumstances. At 
other times, however, Oregon adjusts imported laws to serve Oregon’s unique 
political (not policy) framework, without conducting technical assessments 
of how these adjustments may weaken the laws’ effectiveness.38 In addition, 
because so many of Oregon’s laws emerged from a fast policy network of 
advocates and politicians who have pre-determined preferences for specific
policy models, the potential shortcomings of Oregon’s climate and energy
laws frequently go unexamined.39 Since climate policy success often depends
on underlying regulatory, economic, or physical factors, untailored or poorly
tailored policy imports may fail to perform as expected.40 As a consequence, 
despite dozens of state climate and energy laws, Oregon’s greenhouse gas 
emissions trajectory continues to head in the wrong direction. 
Oregon’s climate and energy governance structure places the state at 
heightened risk for fast policy. Oregon has no designated agency charged 
with overseeing the state’s climate and energy policy needs.41 Instead, Oregon 
laws distribute policymaking responsibility among several agencies and
rarely require effective collaboration or coordination between them. In
addition, because Oregon’s legislature meets only for a full session biannually 
with a one-month session in off years,42 and lawmakers are poorly compensated,43





 41. See id.
 42. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (West, WestlawNext through 11/8/16 General Election) 
(limiting the length of full sessions to 160 calendar days and short sessions to 35, unless a
two-thirds vote for a temporary extension passes both houses). 
43. 2016 Survey: State Legislative Compensation, Session Per Diem and Mileage, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/legismgt/2016_Leg_ 
Comp_Session_Per%20Diem_Mileage.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRA4-8PP9].
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expertise within the legislature is difficult to develop and maintain. As a 
result, Oregon lawmakers rely heavily on external actors to advise and
lobby for policies, rather than technical experts within the state government. 
This policymaking approach—with diffuse responsibility for climate 
and energy governance and reliance on outside actors with narrow aims— 
presents particular risks in the complex and interdependent areas of
climate and energy, where a discrete policy change can have unintended 
system-wide impacts. For example, policies that aim to reduce coal-based 
electricity, but fail to control new investments in natural gas-based power 
generation, risk creating new path dependencies as long-term investments 
are made in new infrastructure to support natural gas.44 These policies also 
increase the likelihood that costs will become stranded—in which case 
ratepayers will face higher prices to pay off failed investments—or that 
policymakers will allow fossil resources to stay online for longer periods 
to avoid stranded costs.45 As another example, policies that promote renewable 
energy development and deployment, but fail to adequately address utilities’
unwillingness to buy renewable power, tend to promote boom and bust
cycles in the renewable energy sector; this in turn adds risk and increases
costs for renewable energy development.46 Moreover, energy policies 
focused only on production and consumption, but not the infrastructure 
and rules related to transmission and transportation, leave huge regulatory 
gaps that undermine renewable energy growth.47 Incomplete policies also 
drive up the political costs of climate mitigation and energy decarbonization, 
as each legislative session or regulatory action that seeks to add incrementally 
to an existing regulatory framework typically comes at some cost politically. 
As deals are made to get incremental policy proposals implemented, essential 
elements of the policies may be cut, either inadvertently or without a full 
understanding of the long-term implications.48 Finally, to the extent any 
flaws in policy design are exposed, the political will to keep working toward 
effective climate mitigation and an energy transition can wane.49 The
urgency of climate change makes poor policy design increasingly unacceptable 
from an environmental and humanitarian perspective. 
To avoid these shortcomings, this article recommends that Oregon and 
other states lacking meaningful climate mitigation and energy decarbonization 
strategies slow down their policymaking so that they can first develop a 
44. See, e.g., S.B. 1547, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016); see also infra Part IV. 
45. See infra Part V; see also Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and
Grid Decarbonization, BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2486&context=faculty_publications [https://perma.cc/83ZH-L7YG].





     
 










   














POWERS2 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2017 11:04 AM 
[VOL. 8:  67, 2016–17] Quick Fixes or Real Remedies? 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW
long-term plan. These states should also ensure that their governance 
structures are in order. Specifically, states should ensure they have a
governance system capable of designing, from the ground-up, a comprehensive 
strategy to decarbonize the energy system and substantially reduce greenhouse 
gases by the middle of the century.50 An adequate governance structure 
would also ensure that regulatory and planning agencies have the expertise,
independence, and capacity to evaluate existing laws, propose new ones, 
monitor implementation, and make adjustments where necessary to reflect
changing conditions.51 With a clear mission, adequate funding, and technical 
expertise, states can move out of the policy fast lane and into a pathway
of strategic and effective policy design and implementation.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the current status of climate
change to illustrate the urgency of effective solutions. Part III then introduces
the basic concepts of fast policy, as described in Jamie Peck and Nik
Theodore’s book, Fast Policy: Experimental Statecraft at the Threshold 
of Neoliberalism. This Part then explains how climate and energy policy
has many of the markings of fast policy. Part IV summarizes Oregon’s
attempts to address climate change through a wide array of policies and laws. 
This Part also examines the outcomes of Oregon’s various programs,
identifies fast policy shortcomings present in Oregon’s programs, and
explains why Oregon’s reputation as a climate leader may not be warranted. 
Part V then uses Oregon’s experience to explain the shortcomings, as well
as some benefits, associated with fast climate and energy policy at the
state level. Finally, Part VI concludes by recommending that states shift 
into a slower, yet steady pace to get out of the fast policy lane and chart a clear
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II. THE URGENCY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Atmospheric levels of CO2 are at a level undetected within at least the 
last 800,000 years,52 and possibly as many as 20 million years.53 In 2016,
the global average temperature was 1.1°C higher than the late 19th century
mean.54 Indeed, 2016 was the hottest year on record, and the third hottest 
year in a row.55 Of the 17 hottest years ever recorded, 16 have occurred since
2000.56 In 2011 and 2012, the number of intense heat waves was nearly 
triple the long-term average.57 Temperature rise is merely one indicator 
among many that show the disruption that human activities—such as the 
combustion of fossil fuels—have had on the planet’s natural systems.58 
The energy imbalance caused by the blanket of CO2 and other greenhouse 
gases has led to impacts across every ecosystem on Earth and across every 
level of biological organization from genes to organisms to populations to 
species to communities to ecosystems.59
 52. See Andrew Freedman, The Last Time CO2 Was This High, Humans Didn’t
Exist, CLIMATE CENTRAL (May 3, 2013), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/the-last­
time-co2-was-this-high-humans-didnt-exist-15938 [https://perma.cc/HA4G-PZNB] (noting that
estimates range from 800,000 to 15 million years since CO2 levels in the atmosphere reached 
400 ppm).
53.  Brett R. Scheffers et al., The Broad Footprint of Climate Change from Genes to
Biomes to People, SCIENCE 719, aa7671-1 (Nov. 11, 2016), http://science.sciencemag.org/
content/354/6313/aaf7671 [https://perma.cc/QK5E-MPFE].
54. NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record Globally, NAT’L 
AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Jan. 17, 2016), https://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/news/
20170118/ [https://perma.cc/CN5L-Q87J].
55. Id.; see also History of Earth’s surface temperature 1880-2016, NAT’L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/videos/history­
earths-surface-temperature-1880-2016 [https://perma.cc/J7NR-NNVK].
56. Jugal K. Patel, How 2016 Became Earth’s Hottest Year on Record, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/18/science/earth/2016­
hottest-year-on-record.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story­
heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news  [https://perma. 
cc/LMG8-XT77]. 
57. Id. at 25 (noting that in 2011, many locations in Texas and Oklahoma experienced
more than 100 days of temperatures over 100 degrees Fahrenheit); see Climate Change Impacts 
in the United States: Highlights, U.S.NAT’L CLIMATEASSESSMENT 24 (2011), http://s3.amazonaws.
com/nca2014/high/NCA3_Highlights_HighRes.pdf?download=1; see also Risky Business: The
Economic Risks of Climate Change in the United States, RISKY BUS. 13 (June 2014), https:// 
riskybusiness.org/site/assets/uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_09_08_14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H5BV-65PH] (noting that another way to put the increasing heat in context is
to note that by 2100, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho could have more days above 95°F 
each year than are currently observed in Texas on an average year).
58. See Hansen et al., Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise, and Superstorms: Evidence from
Paleoclimate Data, Climate Modeling, and Modern Observations that 2°C Global Warming
Could Be Dangerous, 16 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 3761 (2016), http://www.atmos­
chem-phys.net/16/3761/2016/ [https://perma.cc/Y4WV-VSJD].
59.  Scheffers et al., supra note 53. 
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Higher temperatures are leading to rising sea levels.60 Thermal expansion
of water molecules caused by warmer global temperatures and ice melt
from continental ice sheets combine to contribute to sea level rise.61 Even
if the global mean temperature is stabilized, sea levels are expected to 
continue to rise for centuries.62 Paleoclimate data indicates that during the
Eemian period, temperatures were only a few tenths of a degree warmer 
than today, yet sea levels rose to levels roughly 19.5 to 29.5 feet higher
than current levels.63 
In addition, the heightened concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere are
altering the chemical composition of the oceans. Ocean surface waters are 
now 30% more acidic than they were 250 years ago.64 The high acidity 
impairs the ability of marine organisms such as corals, krill, oysters, clams,
and crabs to form shells and skeletons, and to otherwise survive and grow.65 
Marine organisms also face progressively lower oxygen levels as the chemical
composition of the oceans changes, further imperiling species survival66 
and potentially affecting ocean food chains. 
Sea level rise will dramatically impact coastal populations.67 In the
United States, the Southeast and the Atlantic coast face the greatest risks 
by rising ocean levels. Property losses alone, just from sea level rise, could 
cost between $66 billion and $106 billion by 2050 if emissions continue
on their current path.68 In Florida, where three-quarters of the state’s
population and four-fifths of the state’s economy are based in coastal areas,69 
the shoreline is expected to move inland 500 to 2,000 feet.70 Critical 
60. Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5
_summary-for-policymakers.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q546-GK8M] (“Over the period 1901
to 2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 [0.17 to 0.21] m . . . the rate of sea level rise 
since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two 
millennia (high confidence).”). 
61. See Hansen et al., supra note 58, at 3765. 
62. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 60, at 13. 
63. See Hansen et al., supra note 58, at 3800. 
64. U.S. NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 57, at 7. 
65. Id. 
66. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 60, at 13; see
also U.S. NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 57, at 58 (stating that more than 160
million Americans and growing live in coastal watershed counties). 
67. See RISKY BUS., supra note 57, at 21. 
68. See id. at 4.
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infrastructure such as sewage treatment plants and nuclear power plants
will be inundated with seawater,71 while drinking water supplies will face 
saltwater intrusion.72 Miami has spent over $300 million to overhaul the
city’s storm drainage system and buy pumps, gaining the city an expected
two to three decades of preparation for sea level rise.73 Up and down the
Atlantic coast, sandy beaches will be inundated with ocean water, destroying 
natural beauty and economic value associated with tourism, recreation,
fishing.74 
Extreme weather events will likely increase in intensity and frequency 
as the Earth’s energy imbalance increases.75 The North Atlantic faces 
particular challenges as the mid-Atlantic warms and creates a larger water 
vapor repository and the Northern Atlantic cools due to ice melt. The
increased temperature gradient provides more energy for severe weather 
events with higher winds and more precipitation.76 Eighty-eight percent 
of the population of the Northeast lives in coastal counties, and 68% of 
the region’s gross domestic product is generated in these counties.77 
Observations show that Atlantic hurricanes have already increased in intensity, 
frequency, and duration since the early 1980s, and Category 4 and 5 hurricanes 
have become more frequent.78 In addition to supercharged hurricanes on
the east coast, impacts to the water cycle are expected to cause more droughts 
and more episodes of flooding across the country. Today, 10% of U.S. counties 
are at high or extreme risk of water shortages.79 By 2050, 32% of counties
are expected to be at high or extreme risk of water shortages.80 Meanwhile, 
flooding is expected to intensify in many U.S. regions, even where total 
precipitation is expected to decline.81 
As temperatures rise, the risk of extinction increases and accelerates for 
species around the globe.82 Other anthropogenic stressors such as habitat
 71. Id.
 72. See id. (explaining that saltwater intrusion into drinking waters is likely to be 
particularly problematic in south Florida due to its porous limestone subsurface, which
will also undermine the efficacy of sea walls in preventing flooding because the inundation 
will seep up from below). 
73. Id.
74. Okmyung Bin et al., Impacts of Global Warming on North Carolina’s Coastal 
Economy (2007), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/NC%20Climate_
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DBS-PLPV]. 
75. See Hansen et al., supra note 58, at 3779. 
76. Id. at 3780. 
77. RISKY BUS., supra note 57, at 21. 
78. U.S. NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 57, at 24. 
79. Id. at 44. 
80. Id.
 81. Id. 
82. See  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 60, at 13; 
see also Mark C. Urban, Accelerating Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 348 SCIENCE
80
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encroachment and fragmentation have already combined with the effects
of climate change to put species at heightened risk of extinction.83 The 
scientific record indicates that previous eras of climate change at rates
slower than present anthropogenic climate change resulted in significant
ecosystem shifts and species extinctions.84 
Climate-related human health impacts in the United States are already 
being observed.85 Rising temperatures are expected to contribute to multiple
negative impacts on air quality, including increased ground-level ozone 
concentrations and particulate matter emissions from more frequent and 
intense wildfires, worsening pre-existing health conditions and contributing 
to new ones.86 Exposure to extreme weather events negatively impacts 
human physical and mental health in a multitude of ways. Heat waves 
increase heat stroke,87 and flooding exposes populations to contaminated 
571, 571 (May, 2015), science.sciencemag.org/content/348/6234/571.full [https://perma.cc/ 
R4X5-EGNU] (examining 131 published studies on extinction in relation to climate change 
and arriving at the estimate that 7.9% of species are predicted to become extinct because
of climate change, with an upper estimate of 16% of species if we continue on our business 
as usual emissions path). 
83. Paul Opdam & Dirk Wascher, Climate Change Meets Habitat Fragmentation: 
Linking Landscape and Biogeographical Scale Levels in Research and Conservation, 117 
BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 285 (2004), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 
10.1.1.508.7666&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/QD5S-5GCM].
84. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 60, at 13.
85. Allison Crimmins et al., The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in 
the United States: Executive Summary, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESOURCE PROGRAM 2 (2016), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/climatehealth2016/high/ClimateHealth2016_ExecSummary_
Standalone.pdf [https://perma.cc/35F7-CEPC] (“Already in the United States, we have
observed climate-related increases in our exposure to elevated temperature; more frequent, 
severe, or longer-lasting extreme events; degraded air quality; diseases transmitted through
food, water, and disease vectors (such as ticks and mosquitoes); and stresses to our mental 
health and well-being.”).
86. Crimmins et al., supra note 85, at 9; Ozone Pollution, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ozone-pollution/ozone-basics#effects [https://perma.cc/HQ79-Z3SB]
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (noting that ground-level ozone causes respiratory problems 
such as chest pain, coughing, throat irritation, airway inflammation, reduced lung function,
and can damage lung tissue. Ground-level ozone also worsens pre-existing respiratory
problems such as bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma); Particular Matter (PM) Pollution: 
Health and Envtl. Effects of Particulate Matters, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/health-and-environmental-effects-particulate-matter­
pm [https://perma.cc/3TRA-88KL] (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) (stating that Particulate matter 
aggravates asthma, decreases lung function, and causes irritation of the airways, coughing, 
or difficulty breathing, among other negative health effects). 
87.  Crimmins et al., supra note 85, at 5. 
 81






















    
  
  
   
  
  
    
 
 
   
 
     
 
 
POWERS2 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2017 11:04 AM 
water, disrupts essential services, and increases the possibility of drowning.88 
Disease vectors such as ticks and mosquitoes are likely to expand range
and be active for longer periods of the year in a climate change-impacted 
world.89  Increased temperatures also increase threats from Salmonella in 
food.90 Finally, mental health and well-being will suffer as traumatic events
like natural disasters increase in severity and frequency.91 While each of
these health impacts of climate change poses its own unique risk, they are
unlikely to occur independently of one another. Instead, it is more likely that
exposure to multiple climate change threats will occur simultaneously, creating
“compounding or cascading” health impacts.92 
In addition, climate change will profoundly affect agriculture. The Midwest, 
Southeast, and lower Great Plains show particular vulnerability to extreme 
heat and face risk of losing 50-70% of their annual crop yields of corn, 
soy, cotton, and wheat absent agricultural adaptation.93 In fact, the 2011 
heat wave in Texas and Oklahoma resulted in more than $10 billion in
direct losses in agriculture alone.94 Weeds, disease, insect pests, and other 
stressors will also affect crop and livestock production.95 Higher winter
temperatures can also lead to early bud bloom for some perennial plants, 
which can result in frost damage when cold conditions occur in late spring.96 
Finally, water for irrigation will be in high demand at the same time that 
the water cycle is undergoing dramatic changes.97 
Amongst challenges to the planet’s natural systems, climate change will 
pose an immense challenge to the planet’s political systems. The Department
of Defense has recognized climate change as a top strategic risk to our 
national interests.98 As President Obama noted, “all of these effects can 
88. Id. at 5. 
89. Id. at 5, 13. 
90. Id. at 13. 
91. Id. (noting that mental health impacts can include stress from disruption and
financial ruin, feelings of helplessness, mental and physical fatigue from trying to rebuild
and recoup losses); see Sandy Keenan, Dark Water: A Year After Hurricane Sandy, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/garden/dark-water-a-year-after­
hurricane-sandy.html [https://perma.cc/Z8S9-4VBT]. 
92.  Crimmins et al., supra note 85, at 4. 
93. RISKY BUS., supra note 57, at 5. 
94. U.S. NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 57, at 25.
 95. Id. at 46. 
96. Id. 
97. See id. at 21, 43 (noting that water demands for irrigation will be particularly
acute in arid areas such as the western United States, where 81% of consumptive uses of 
water go to irrigation of crops).
98. National Security Strategy, WHITE HOUSE 12 (2015), obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBC6-EZMJ]
(“Climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to
82
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lead to population migration within and across international borders, spur
crises, and amplify or accelerate conflict in countries or regions already 
facing instability and fragility.”99 Climate change is thus a threat multiplier
that exacerbates underlying social tension by creating conditions that further
marginalize the vulnerable,100 pushing tenable situations over the edge into
unmanageable disorder. 




The growing urgency of climate change has spurred climate and energy
policymaking at the international, national, and subnational levels. Since 
the early 1990s, governments have enacted an array of policies to mitigate 
climate change and promote a transition away from fossil-fueled energy 
production. Many of these policies embrace neoliberal approaches to 
regulation, either through direct and indirect mechanisms to place a price
on carbon or through market-based tools that aim to increase flexibility and 
lower costs associated with regulatory compliance. To a large extent, the
development of these policies has involved fast policy transfers. This section 
first describes the fast policy premise described by Peck and Theodore. It
then explains the fast dynamics of climate and energy policymaking.
A. The Fast Policy Premise
For years, social scientists have studied the ways in which policies
move between jurisdictions and within jurisdictions, both vertically and 
horizontally. In the United States, policy transfers have led to some of the 
nation’s most well-known laws, including the Affordable Care Act101 
increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and 
water.”).
99. Presidential Memorandum – Climate Change and National Security, WHITE HOUSE
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/21/presidential­
memorandum-climate-change-and-national-security [https://perma.cc/HXH9-QAY3]. 
100. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 60, at 16
(“Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people . . . [and] [p]opulations 
that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme 
weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income. Climate change can 
indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers of 
these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks.”).
101. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 18001-18121 (West,
WestlawNext through P.L. 115-22). 
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(or Obamacare), which was modeled in part off of Massachusetts’
Romneycare,102 and the Clean Air Act,103 which was modeled in part off
of California’s air quality laws.104 More than a century ago, the United States’ 
model of electric utility regulation derived from a legal scheme that was
crafted in New York, revised in Wisconsin, and then transferred to other 
states.105 Policy transfers are thus an age-old and fundamental tool for
importing and adapting successful laws to new jurisdictions. 
Over the past few decades, however, policy transfers have increased in 
scale and speed, due in large part to the efforts of international and
national networks of experts and funders, leading to a much faster policy 
distribution process.106 This fast policy involves accelerating rates of
policy transfer around the globe, “in which local policy experiments exist 
in relation to near and far relatives, to traveling models and technocratic 
designs, and to a host of financial, technical, social, and symbolic networks
that invariably loop through centers of power and persuasion.”107 Fast 
policy thus typically involves 1) the initial development at the local level 
of an effective policy solution to a local problem, often over a period of 
years and with substantial policy adaptation in response to implementation
challenges; 2) identification and endorsement by national or international 
experts of the local policy—particularly if it employs neoliberal strategies— 
as a model for other national and subnational governments to follow;
3) development by the experts of a set of “best practices” that policy adopters
should use; 4) local adoption of the model policy and best practices, often 
without careful adaptation to local conditions; and 5) continued adherence 
by the network of experts to the policy model and best practices, even
when they fail in practice.108 
As policies have become increasingly mobile, the technical analysis and 
local tailoring that used to accompany policy transfers has diminished.109 
Local policymakers increasingly defer to the network of policy experts 
and advocates who use a top-down model to promote local adoption of 
102. J.D. Kleinke, The Conservative Case for Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/opinion/sunday/why-obamacare-is-a-conservatives­
dream.html [https://perma.cc/M8ZU-ZLLU].
103. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 
115-22).
104. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, California’s Pied Piper of Clean Air, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/13/business/california-s-pied-piper-of­
clean-air.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/KX54-6D3F].
105. See  RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 12–15 (1999).
106. PECK & THEODORE, supra note 25, at xxxi. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at xxxi–xxxii, 131–43. 
109. Id. at xxxi–xxxii. 
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designated best practices to address seemingly common problems.110 By
relying on sanctioned model programs, local governments can attempt to
address problems swiftly through programs their proponents argue are 
proven to work. While these sanctioned programs can succeed, the absence 
of thoughtful tailoring can make fast policy ill-suited to complex and unique 
local circumstances.111 
According to Peck and Theodore, fast policy propagates despite a lack
of empirical evidence of success, and even when policy models fail. For 
example, Fast Policy explores the use of conditional cash transfers (CCTs)— 
aid programs in which payments are conditioned on poor families fulfilling
certain tasks, such as meeting school attendance and health screening 
requirements.112 Fast Policy examines New York City’s embrace of the
CCT aid model, which originated and succeeded in Mexico after about a
decade of field testing, monitoring, and fine-tuning.113 Based on the ultimate
success in Mexico, and encouraged by the World Bank and charitable
foundations, New York City then imported CCTs into its own aid system.114 
However, in the process of the policy transference, New York made its
own CCT program increasingly complex, without any initial analysis of 
how the revised CCT model would perform.115 Ultimately, the New York
experience failed.116 Yet, despite this failure, other governments, encouraged
by the World Bank, continue to adopt CCTs modeled off of New York’s 
program.117 Indeed, even as CCTs have achieved “unruly” outcomes “in the
wild,” their proponents continue to advocate for their adoption.118 
The authors attribute the ongoing commitment to CCTs—and most fast
policies—to an enduring global commitment to neoliberal, or market-
based, programs to address a range of problems.119 CCTs turn direct aid 
110. Id. at 3–4. 
111. Id. at 234–35 (discussing ways that policy models form and constrain local policy
innovation); id. at 236 (discussing the importance of local cultivation of participatory 
budgeting and the ways in which fast policy discourages such local cultivation); see also
id. at chs. 2–8 (examining case studies of fast policy).
112. Id. at 46.
 113. Id. at 65–72. 
114. Id. at 45–65. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 79–83 (noting that New York had “reconstructed the model to suit local 
circumstances, but made the mistake of overelaborating the imported model and rushing
its implementation.”).
117. Id. at 83–84. 
118. Id. at 131. 
119. Id. at 131–43. 
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(money-for-nothing) into a money-for-something exchange that requires 
performance by the poor.120 This appeals to the neoliberal resistance to 
pure welfare and reaffirms the corollary belief that poverty results from 
bad behavior, rather than misfortune and circumstance.121 Because CCTs
align so well with neoliberal views, they remain popular policies notwithstanding
a substantial record of failure.122 CCT proponents are quick to dismiss any 
failures as ongoing experimentation, while advertising the overarching
policy approach as fundamentally sound.123 The tendency to value orthodoxy
above empiricism enables fast policy to spread.124 As the next section argues,
this is particularly true in the accelerating world of fast climate and energy
policy.
B. Fast Climate and Energy Policy 
Fast policy and quick fixes are increasingly common in the fields of climate
and energy law. In particular, climate and energy policies that embrace
market mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and scale up
renewable resources have the markings of fast policy. Although debates rage
between which market mechanisms perform best, exemplified by the ongoing 
contest between carbon tax and emissions trading,125 the policies are
ultimately vying for the top fast policy slot. Lost in the debate, however, are
empirical experiences about how the policies have in fact performed and
deeper examinations of whether other tailored policies might achieve better
outcomes.126 Fast policy has come to dominate climate and energy policy on
a global and national level. 
Greenhouse gas emissions trading programs exemplify the rise of fast 
climate policy. As Professors Holly Doremus and W. Michael Hanemann
explain, economists began promoting emissions trading in the 1960s and
1970s as a theoretically superior solution to direct environmental regulation.127 
Under a typical emissions trading system, regulators cap the total allowable 
120. Id. at 134, 139. 
121. Id. at 135. 
122. Id.
 123. Id. at 139–40. 
124. Id. at 141–42. 
125. These policies are discussed further below, but for more on the debate, see 
generally Putting a Price on Carbon: An Emissions Cap or a Tax?, YALE ENV’T 360 (May
7, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/features/putting_a_price_on_carbon_an_emissions_cap_or_a_
tax [https://perma.cc/65TT-FNGG] (providing several experts’ arguments for one mechanism 
or the other). 
126. See id. (noting that some cite the mere existence of trading schemes as proof
that they work, but the discussion rarely if ever delves beneath the surface to assess how 
well a particular mechanism works). 
127. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 32, at 801. 
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amount of pollution, allocate emissions allowances to entities regulated under 
the cap, and allow the regulated entities to buy and sell emissions allowances
as necessary.128 Economists believe that emissions trading enables more
cost-effective reductions and promotes innovation, at lower administrative 
expense.129 Captivated by the promises of emissions trading, in the 1970s
and 1980s, regulators began to incorporate emissions trading concepts into
existing regulatory programs.130 In 1990, Congress then fully embraced
emissions trading when it enacted the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program,
which uses emissions trading to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions.131 When 
sulfur dioxide emissions then decreased—although not necessarily because
of emissions trading132—emissions trading became a key component of U.S. 
environmental law. Today, nearly every environmental program developed
by the Environmental Protection Agency includes “some form of environmental 
trading.”133 
Emissions trading then quickly spread to greenhouse gas emissions programs 
at the international and domestic levels.134 Indeed, emissions trading seemed 
particularly suited for greenhouse gases due to their fungible nature and 
negligible direct effects on the local environmental and human health.135 
The theoretical benefits of emissions trading soon became orthodoxy,
notwithstanding the increasing numbers of empirical analyses and countervailing
theoretical arguments indicating that emissions trading suffered from several 
shortcomings, including weak caps and allowance overallocations,136 complex 
administration,137 disincentives for technological innovation,138 potential 
128. Id. at 807–09. 
129. Id. at 802, 810. 
130. Id. at 802. 
131. Id.
 132. E.g., Curtis A. Moore, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: Failing the Acid Test, 
34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10366, 10379 (2004). 
133. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 32, at 802–03 (quoting David M. Driesen,
Trading and Its Limits, 14 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 169 (2006)).
134. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 32, at 804. 
135. Id. at 803. 
136. See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”: The Role of the Regulatory 
Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 276 n.37, 312 (2007). 
137. Id. at 304. 
138. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 32, at 810; see also David M. Driesen, Is Emissions 
Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic 
Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 325–27 (1998). 
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exacerbation of environmental injustice,139 and market volatility.140 Despite 
the warnings coming from early emissions trading experiences, governments
continued to support emissions trading, with California playing a prominent 
domestic role in becoming the first state to create its own economy-wide
emissions trading program for greenhouse gases.141 To date, California’s
program has experienced several of the problems emissions trading skeptics
had foretold.142 These include emissions overallocation, market uncertainty, 
exacerbated environmental injustice, and price volatility.143 Recent analyses
show that actual greenhouse gas emissions reductions in California have 
resulted from other California regulatory programs, and not from emissions 
trading.144 Despite these facts-on-the-ground, however, other states—including 
Oregon—continue to march onward in the direction of adopting their own 
emissions trading programs modeled off of California’s.145 Emissions trading 
has, in short, become the quickest of the fast policies, although others have
begun to catch up.
In particular, carbon taxes are frequently touted as the superior option
to emissions trading programs.146 Whereas emissions trading places an indirect 
price on greenhouse gas emissions, carbon taxes directly charge consumers
or producers of carbon-intensive products for their emissions.147 Carbon 
taxes seek to internalize the costs of pollution that are otherwise externalized,
139. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 32, at 803; see also Alice Kaswan, Environmental 
Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10287, 10293–94 (2008). 
140. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Auctioning the Building Blocks of Life: Carbon
Auction, the Law, and Global Warming, 23 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 317, 
349, 373–74 (2009) (discussing trading and price volatility). 
141.  A.B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). 
142. See Debra Kahn, Calif. Carbon Offsets Face Slowdown in Market Development, 
CLIMATE WIRE (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060026292 
[https://perma.cc/3H94-XJPU] (discussing price volatility and market uncertainty); Lesley
McAllister, Auction Results in California Cap and Trade, ENVTL. L. PROFESSOR BLOG
(May 21, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2013/05/auction­
results-in-california-cap-and-trade-.html [https://perma.cc/manage/create] (discussing over 
allocation); Alan Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 
HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 109, 122, 133–43 (2014) (discussing environmental 
justice issues and litigation against the California system).
143. See McAllister, supra note 142; Ramo, supra note 142, at 122. 
144. See Debra Kahn, Taking the Economic Temperature 10 Years After A.B. 32, 
CLIMATE WIRE (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060043254/print [https://perma.cc/
3GJG-FCGZ] (discussing economists’ reports). 
145. See, e.g., Elizabeth Harball, Ore. ToConsider Cap-and-Trade Systems, CLIMATEWIRE
(May 17, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060037348/search?keyword=
oregon+california+trading+system [https://perma.cc/JQM9-M89Q] (discussing Oregon’s 
consideration of the California model). 
146. See, e.g., YALE ENV’T 360, supra note 125. 
147. See generally Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon 
Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 513–14 (2009). 
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and thereby correct the profound market failures in the fossil fuel sectors.148 
Carbon taxes also send price signals to market participants to reduce their
use of carbon-intensive products and increase their use of carbon-free 
ones.149 Whether market participants actually hear these signals depends
on the stringency and structure of the tax.150 Moreover, even if the signal 
is received, there is no guarantee that behaviors will or even can change 
in response. In other words, the success of a carbon tax hinges on both the 
design of the tax system and multiple exogenous factors.151 Nonetheless, 
carbon taxation has also become a silver bullet, fast policy solution.
Renewable energy policies have also become increasingly fast. For
example, RPS policies, which have become one of the most ubiquitous
policies supporting renewable energy deployment and are likely the most 
important drivers of renewable energy development in the United States,152 
routinely include tradable compliance credits that have the markings of
fast policy design. Iowa was the first state to enact an RPS,153 but other states
quickly followed, importing and adjusting Iowa’s program to include 
marketable compliance credits. Specifically, states began to add market-
based renewable energy credit (REC) programs to allow regulated utilities 
and renewable producers to buy and sell RECs separately from the renewable 
electricity itself.154 States then further tailored REC programs to allow carve-
outs, multipliers, banking, and borrowing.155 While these rules were developed 
to support increased renewable energy development, production, and sales,
many REC rules have actually suppressed renewable energy development 
148. Id. at 500, 512. 
149. Id. at 500, 523. 
150. Id. at 523. 
151. See id. (discussing design flaws of current carbon taxes and proposing changes 
for future ones). 
152. See, e.g., Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio­
standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/5KNF-ZSX3] (showing numerous states have adopted RPSs).
153. Id.
 154. See Special Report: Renewable Energy Certificates, PLATTS (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.platts.com/im.platts.content/insightanalysis/industrysolutionpapers/recspecial
report1112.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX89-N5CM] (noting the conceptualization of RECs in
1990 (after Iowa adopted its standard)). 
155. Warren Leon, Clean Energy States Alliance, The State of State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE 10 (June 2013), http://www.cesa.org/assets/ 
2013-Files/RPS/State-of-State-RPSs-Report-Final-June-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP4Z-UHL6]
(discussing multipliers and carve-outs); Richard Schmalensee, Evaluating Policies to Increase
Electricity Generation from Renewable Energy, 6 Rev. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 45, 56 (2012)
(discussing REC banking in various states). 
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or injected uncertainty into the market. For example, carve-outs can create
separate markets for specific resources that need additional support, but 
suppress demand once the carve-out amount has been fulfilled.156 Multipliers, 
which reward additional RECs for specific resources, accelerate attainment
with the RPS and can cause rapid market saturation, which ultimately suppresses 
demand.157 Finally, banking, which allows utilities to store surplus RECs 
for future use, can likewise suppress future demand for renewable electricity.158 
Despite the unintended consequences of these market-oriented rules, states
continue to include them in their RPSs, consistent with the fast policy process
of following the leader and ignoring empirical results. 
Ongoing debates regarding feed-in tariffs and net metering further 
exemplify the risks of fast policy in the energy sector. Although feed-in 
tariffs—which guarantee renewable energy producers fixed prices and
long-term contracts for renewable power—have created “turmoil” in other 
countries,159 they continue to be a policy of choice in energy policy circles.
Net metering also remains a popular policy tool, even though controversies
regarding net metering illustrate how careless policy adoption can wreak
havoc on renewable energy programs. Net metering allows utility customers 
who generate renewable energy to apply the amount they generate against 
the amount they consume from the grid, providing users significant savings
on their electric bill.160 Public utility commissions developed the first net
metering programs, and by 1995, only two states had enacted legislation
requiring net metering.161 But net metering quickly spread after 1995,
leading Congress in 2005 to require electric utilities to offer net metering
by 2007.162 With its rise, net metering has been at the center of a number 
of recent controversial rulemakings, in which some public utility commissions 
156. Warren Leon, Clean Energy States Alliance, Designing the Right RPS: A Guide 
to Selecting Goals and Program Options for a Renewable Portfolio Standard, CLEAN
ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE 40–41 (2012), http://cesa.org/assets/2012-Files/RPS/CESA­
RPS-Goals-and-Program-Design-Report-March-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX52-29AF]
(discussing the pros and cons of a carve-out).
157. Id. at 41–42 (noting one con of a credit multiplier is that it decreases the overall
amount of renewable energy that an RPS brings online). 
158. See infra Part IV.A.2.b (discussing Oregon’s problems with indefinite banking). 
159. See Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA.
L. REV. 937 (2014). 
160. See Melissa Powers et al., Countdown to 2050: Sharpening Oregon’s Climate 
Action Tools, GREEN ENERGY INST. 30 (Nov. 2015), https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/23144­
countdown-to-2050-report [https://perma.cc/9DTH-N2LS] (discussing Oregon’s few transportation
policies).
161. Yih-HueiWan,Net Metering Programs, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY,
TOPICAL ISSUES BRIEF 1–2 (1996). 
162.  Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1251, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
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have enacted reactionary rules designed to curtail net metering.163 These 
reactionary responses have created disarray in the states’ renewable energy
sectors, spurred lawsuits, and wasted time and expense as the commissions
revisit their initial rulings.164 Such reactionary responses are often the outfall 
of fast and reckless policymaking. 
To be sure, not all energy and climate policy transfer fits squarely into 
the fast policy framework. Some policies that have moved quickly between
governments do not represent neoliberal values, and some policy transfers 
have occurred laterally, rather than through international or national 
experts and intermediaries that seek to propagate a limited set of policy 
instruments at the local levels. While these distinctions arguably make the 
policy transfers ineligible for “fast policy” designation, the propensity of 
governments to engage in rapid policy adoption reveals a legislative and
regulatory bias towards “quick fixes.” Moreover, several state and local 
governments have engaged in deliberative policy development and design
to create climate and energy policies that are well suited to local conditions. 
However, as concerns about climate change continue to escalate, states 
and local governments face increasing pressure to adopt policies that expert 
networks have endorsed. Although some might argue that the adoption of 
any policies to mitigate climate change and promote a transition away
from fossil fuels represents progress, Oregon’s experience as a quick fix
and fast policy purveyor illustrates the risks of moving too fast in climate 
and energy policy design.
IV. OREGON’S LIFE IN THE FAST LANE
For more than a decade, Oregon has demonstrated an ongoing awareness 
of the urgency of climate change and has responded by enacting dozens 
of laws and policies aimed at mitigating Oregon’s contribution to the problem.
If the sole standard of a state’s leadership were the number of policies adopted, 
163. See, e.g., Benjamin Storrow, Is Nev. Poised to Change Course on Net Metering?, 
CLIMATE WIRE (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060045090/ 
[https://perma.cc/8P8B-Q35Z] (discussing Nevada, the “poster child” for the debate on 
net metering). 
164. Id. (noting the net metering change was reversed); Daniel Cusick, Nev. Faces
Solar Exodus in Wake of Rate Changes, CLIMATE WIRE (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.
eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060030395 [https://perma.cc/36T4-2T9G] (discussing the
immediate negative impacts of Nevada’s decision to reduce net metering, including the loss of
solar panel manufacturing firms and significant political and legal pressure).
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Oregon’s reputation as a climate leader would be well deserved.165 
However, not all of Oregon’s policies have been effective in achieving 
their purposes; some have even been counterproductive in transitioning 
the state towards a clean energy future. To at least some extent, the success
of Oregon’s policies appears to depend on the simplicity of the policy, the 
degree to which Oregon developed the policies from the ground up, and
the extent to which Oregon has tailored imported policies to the state’s unique 
circumstances. Policy success also seems to hinge on the degree to which 
Oregon has established an effective governance system for implementing, 
evaluating, and adjusting its policies. In contrast, to the extent Oregon has 
imported complex policies without effective local tailoring or added complexity
to otherwise straightforward imported policies, Oregon’s policies have
tended to fall short. Part A.1 thus discusses some of Oregon’s effective 
policy designs and imports, Parts A.2 and A.3 discuss Oregon policies that 
have not lived up to expectations, and Part B explores the role that Oregon’s
existing regulatory and governance structure plays in Oregon’s climate and
energy policymaking effectiveness.
A. Oregon’s Climate and Energy Policies 
Oregon’s existing climate and energy policies either establish broad economy- 
wide goals or focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity 
sector. Although addressing other sectors is crucial for a comprehensive 
climate change strategy, Oregon has few policies addressing emissions 
from other sectors, such as transportation or land use.166 Within the areas in 
which Oregon has developed climate change policies, Oregon’s greatest 
successes have resulted from its energy efficiency programs and policies
designed to prevent construction of new coal-fired power plants. In contrast,
many of Oregon’s programs that aim to increase renewable energy and otherwise
transition away from fossil fuels have incorporated design elements that 
increase the programs’ complexity and weaken their effectiveness.
1. Oregon’s Successes from Careful or Simple Policy Design 
Oregon’s successful energy efficiency programs and programs to prevent 
investment in new coal-fired power plants employ different regulatory models. 
While the energy efficiency programs require ongoing administration and 
monitoring, the coal-related laws use clear regulatory standards that require
 165. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, DSIRE—N.C.
CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., http://www.dsireusa.org/ [https://perma.cc/JEP2-H4WZ] (showing,
in fact, that the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency ranks Oregon 
as the fifth state for number of policies). 
166. See Powers et al., supra note 160, at 17–18, 20, 44. 
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little administration. This section argues that effective regulatory and 
governance structures and simplicity, respectively, have enabled Oregon’s
successes in these areas.
a. Energy Efficiency Achievements
Energy efficiency policies have been a mainstay in Oregon’s energy
portfolio for decades.167 In 1981, Oregon adopted a policy requiring its
investor-owned utilities and public utilities to: administer energy conservation
programs for residential and commercial customers, provide customers
with information about the program, offer energy audits and other technical
advice, and provide financing options for energy efficiency upgrades.168 In 
1999, Oregon established a public purchase charge of 3% of utilities’ 
annual retail revenues; Oregon allocated 63% of the collected funds toward 
energy conservation and market transformation measures.169 In 2007, 
legislators extended the public purchase charge to the end of 2025.170 
Additionally, in 2005, Oregon adopted energy efficiency standards for 
appliances, requiring appliances sold or installed in Oregon to be registered 
as compliant on a multi-state compliance website.171 Finally, in 2009, Oregon
enacted legislation to increase energy efficiency in buildings.172 
To ensure the successful implementation of these policies, Oregon 
created a program manager, the Energy Trust of Oregon (ETO), which is 
responsible for most of Oregon’s success in improving energy efficiency. 
Established in 2002, the ETO is an independent nonprofit that oversees 
conservation programs with some of its funding provided by the state’s 
public purpose charge.173 ETO’s structure is critical to Oregon’s successful 
energy efficiency programs. In many states, utilities that have a financial
stake in selling more electricity are expected to also encourage energy 
167. See 2015–2017 State of Oregon Biennial Energy Plan, OR. DEP’T ENERGY 11, 
https://www.oregon.gov/energy/Data-and-Reports/Documents/2015-2017%20Biennial%
20Energy%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GX2-WXGP] (last visited Apr. 23, 2017) (“Energy
conservation is the foundation of Oregon’s energy policy and traditionally its first ‘fuel’
of choice to meet energy demand.”).
168. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 469.010, 469.651 (2015). 
169. S.B. 1149, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 757.612). 
170. S.B. 838, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 757.612). 
171. H.B. 3363, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 469.233).
172.  S.B. 79, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 455.505). 
173. See Timeline, ENERGY TR. OR., https://energytrust.org/timeline/ [https://perma.cc/
5EBJ-HC6P]. 
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conservation.174 The inherent internal conflicts in this arrangement are
often brushed aside. However, with ETO, its mission and independence 
from the electric utilities allow it to zero-in on efficiency.175 Oregon’s design 
of the ETO was a homegrown policy that has served the state well.
According to the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy’s 
annual review, Oregon currently ranks as the seventh state in the nation 
for energy efficiency.176 This ranking has dropped in recent years,177 suggesting 
that the state is losing momentum in this action area or that other states
have improved. It is also possible that spending guidelines imposed on
ETO by the legislature and the PUC are unduly constraining ETO’s ability
to invest in innovative efficiency programs.178 Despite this moderate drop 
in performance, however, Oregon ranks highly in its energy efficiency
achievements and, more importantly, has the ability through the ETO to
identify and correct program deficiencies. 
b. Emissions Standards for New Coal-Fired Power Plants 
Oregon has also achieved policy success through emissions standards 
aimed at preventing construction of new fossil fuel-fired power generation
facilities. In 2009, Oregon adopted an emissions standard for new power 
plants of 1,100 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour, a standard too stringent 
for coal-fired power plants to meet.179 Oregon took the additional step of
prohibiting utilities from entering into new long-term power purchase 
agreements for baseload power from plants that exceed the emission
 174. See Susan Arterian Chang, The Rise of the Energy Efficiency Utility, IEEE SPECTRUM
(May 1, 2008), http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/conservation/the-rise-of-the-energy­
efficiency-utility [https://perma.cc/3HQJ-JEL5].
175. Id. 
176. See State and Local Policy Database: State Scorecard Rank, AM. COUNCIL FOR
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., http://database.aceee.org/state-scorecard-rank [https://perma.cc/
77WU-GR72] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (ranking Oregon seventh in 2016). 
177. Prior to 2016, Oregon had consistently ranked in the top five states since the 
rankings began. See Oregon ranked fourth most energy-efficient state, ENERGY TR. BLOG
(Nov. 6, 2015), https://blog.energytrust.org/oregon-ranked-fourth-most-energy-efficient­
state/ [https://perma.cc/4ZS3-ETNM]; Oregon ranked 3rd most energy-efficient state, ENERGY
TR. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2014), https://blog.energytrust.org/oregon-ranked-3rd-most-energy­
efficient-state/ [https://perma.cc/9DAV-7T3D]; Oregon ranked 4th most energy-efficient 
state for three years running, ENERGY TR. BLOG (Dec. 5, 2013), https://blog.energytrust.org/
oregon-ranked-4th-most-energy-efficient-state-for-three-years-running/ [https://perma.cc/ZDT3-
MV79] (“The nonprofit has produced the scorecard for seven years and Oregon has
consistently been in the top five.”). 
178. See Inara Scott, “Dancing Backward In High Heels”: Examining and Addressing
the Disparate Regulatory Treatment of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Resources, 43 ENVTL.
L. 255, 284–85 (2013), https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/14248-43-2-scott [https://perma.cc/DXP7­
VCS2]; see generally Powers et al., supra note 160, at 24, 35 (discussing guidelines).
179. OR. REV. STAT. § 757.524 (2017). 
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standard.180 These emissions standards set clear requirements that effectively 
prohibited new investments in new coal resources. In combination with a 
settlement to a Clean Air Act citizen suit that requires the state’s only in­
state coal-fired power plant to close,181 Oregon’s emissions standards will 
eliminate production of in-state coal-fired power by 2020.182 
Collectively, the energy efficiency programs and emissions standards 
exemplify two successful strategies for effective climate and energy
policymaking. Oregon’s energy efficiency programs, which require ongoing
implementation and monitoring, succeed because Oregon created an effective
administrative structure through the ETO. Oregon’s emissions standards 
do not require a separate administrative mechanism, because they establish 
clear requirements that existing agencies can administer. Both of these
policies thus illustrate how policymaking tailored to local conditions can
succeed.
2. Oregon’s Mixed Results from Complex Energy Policies 
and Inadequate Governance 
In contrast to the examples above, many of Oregon’s climate and energy 
programs lack simplicity and an effective administrative structure. Oregon 
has dozens of climate and energy laws on the books. This section explores 
a few of them to illustrate how Oregon’s policy development—much of
which occurred through fast policy development or efforts to develop quick 
fixes to highly complex problems—has not lived up to expectations. 
Oregon has only scratched the surface of its potential for wind and solar 
deployment. Oregon’s rainy and forested reputation overlooks the sunny 
and arid eastern half of the state where wind and solar resources are
abundant.183 Furthermore, Oregon enjoys sunny summers, and its moderate
temperatures provide ideal operating conditions for solar photovoltaic (PV) 
180. Id. §§ 757.531(1)(a), 757.533, 757.536 (2017). 
181. Commission Acknowledges PGE Long-Range Energy Plan with Boardman Closure, 
PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION OR. (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.puc.state.or.us/Pages/news/
2010/2010027.aspx [https://perma.cc/C2C7-BWN2].
182. Oregon has also enacted legislation to restrict the import of coal-based electricity
from outside the state. Part IV, infra, discusses the legislation. 
183. “The solar resource east of the Cascades is typically 30-to-40 percent greater
than the Willamette Valley or Coast. However, solar energy technologies work throughout 
Oregon . . .” OR. DEP’T ENERGY, supra note 167, at 21. However, solar energy technologies 
work throughout Oregon. Additionally, the state has geothermal, biomass, and ocean energy
potential.  Id.
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panels.184 Within the service territories of the two large investor-owned
utilities that dominate the state’s electricity market, Oregon has the technical 
potential to produce 66 GW of solar PV systems.185 Yet, by 2015, Oregon
only had 134 MW of solar PV installed in the state, making Oregon twentieth 
in the nation.186 Oregon has done only marginally better with developing
wind. Oregon experienced a wind boom between 2008 and 2012;187 as a
result, Oregon has a cumulative installed nameplate capacity of 3,163 MW 
of wind, good enough for eighth place nationally.188 Whereas solar has
shown newfound promise in Oregon in the past few years, bringing 30
MW nameplate capacity online in 2015,189 the state’s wind development has
declined dramatically, with only one new wind energy source representing 
10.2 MW of nameplate capacity coming online since 2012.190 Although 
Oregon has enacted a number of policies intended to encourage the
development of renewable energy resources in the state, less than one-half
of a percent of its technical solar potential and just over five percent of its 
technical wind potential have been installed.191 
As for Oregon’s policies targeted at reducing greenhouse gases and 
mitigating climate change, Oregon’s performance is even worse. Oregon 
has yet to enact an economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions limitation, 
and its emissions trajectory is far in excess of the state’s aspirational
greenhouse gas reduction goal.
These shortcomings, however, are not due to a lack of political will to 
address climate change and promote an energy transition. Rather, they result
 184. See generally Northwest Solar Resource Maps, U. OR. SOLAR RADIATION MONITORING
LAB. (Feb. 17, 2004), http://solardat.uoregon.edu/NorthwestSolarResourceMaps.html
[https://perma.cc/R59Y-WWTK].
185. Black & Veatch, Solar Generation Market Research, PORTLAND GENERAL
ELECTRIC (2015), https://www.portlandgeneral.com/-/media/public/our-company/energy­
strategy/documents/2015-08-13-solar-generation-market-research.pdf?la=en [https://perma. 
cc/WY39-G5BP]; Revised Overview of PV Inputs, Data Sources, and Potential Study Results, 
CADMUS GROUP, INC. (2012), http://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pacificorp/doc/ 
Energy_Sources/Integrated_Resource_Plan/2013IRP/PAC_2013IRP_Memo_PVInputs_
09282012.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT9F-ZEFR]. 
186. Solar Spotlight: Oregon, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N (2016), http://www. 
seia.org/state-solar-policy/oregon [https://perma.cc/MK85-C3E2].
187. Id.
 188. Oregon Wind Energy, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,  http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/ 
FileDownloads/pdfs/Oregon.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9M7-E7TQ] (last visited Apr. 16, 2017). 
189. SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, supra note 186. 
190. See Renewable Energy Projects, RENEWABLE NORTHWEST PROJECT, http://www.
rnp.org/project_map [https://perma.cc/2TWV-5HRJ] (last visited Apr. 16, 2017); see also 
Project Chopin, RENEWABLE NORTHWEST, http://www.rnp.org/node/project-chopin [https:// 
perma.cc/H5FV-4NZM] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
191. These percentages reflect the state’s deployment of roughly 3,000 MW of wind
out of its 60,000 MW potential and of 124 MW of solar out of its 66 GW of potential. See
AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 188; SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, supra note 186. 
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from poorly designed policies, many of which deploy ineffective market-
based strategies to increase flexibility for regulated entities. Many of these 
flexibility measures, moreover, derive from programs developed by others 
at the international, national, and subnational level that entered Oregon’s
regulatory system through a fast policy approach.
In short, as the examples that follow show, Oregon has a demonstrated
willingness to enact policies that promote clean energy development, increase 
utilities’ obligations to buy renewable power, and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from the energy sector. However, many of these policies are
unnecessarily complicated and suffer from the many problems associated
with fast policy adoption and a desire for quick fixes. In particular, Oregon’s
legislative efforts reveal an unwillingness to identify and address the core
inhibitors of a clean energy economy. Oregon’s policy experience also shows
that Oregon frequently engages in shortsighted and reactive policymaking, 
rather than in deliberative and thoughtful policy design. As Part V explains, 
this quick-fix approach to climate and energy policymaking undermines the
stability and predictability of the regulatory landscape, thereby imperiling 
businesses in the field, unnecessarily increasing risk, and stifling a productive 
investment atmosphere necessary for decarbonization. To illustrate Oregon’s 
tendency toward quick fixes and fast policy, the following sections discuss 
some of Oregon’s most important clean energy and climate policies.
a. State Tax Credits and Loan Programs 
Oregon’s efforts to promote renewable energy development through
state tax credits and low interest loan programs date back to the late 1970s.
In 1977, Oregon enacted the Residential Energy Tax Credit (RETC)
to encourage homeowners to install renewable energy technologies.192 In 
1979, Oregon enacted the Business Energy Tax Credit (BETC) to encourage
commercial entities to invest in renewable energy technologies.193 Later 
that year, Oregon enacted the Small-Scale Energy Loan Program, which 
offers low-interest, fixed-rate, long-term loans for renewable energy projects.194
 192. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 469B.130–469B.169 (2017); OR. ADMIN. R. §§ 330-070-0010­
330-070-0097 (2017). 
193. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Kaplan, Deputy Dir. Or. Dep’t of Energy, to Senate
Interim Comm. on Env’t & Nat. Res,  (Jan. 15, 2013), https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2013I1/
Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/31801 [https://perma.cc/QM29-G9NX] (outlining the 
history of the BETC program). 
194. OR. REV. STAT. § 470.060 (2015). 
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These programs have provided critical support to renewable energy, yet
they frequently get cut.
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of Oregon’s reactionary and ineffective 
management of individual clean energy and climate policies, both at the
administrative and the legislative levels, is the BETC program. In 2007, 
the legislature tweaked the long-standing program195 by importing two 
key components of federal renewable energy support: first, the legislature 
significantly expanded the program to offer very large tax credits; and second, 
the legislature adopted the federal tax equity investor provision, creating 
a “pass-through” mechanism.196 Unfortunately, the legislature lacked the
foresight to realize the expanded program’s potential popularity and failed
to provide either additional funding or additional authority to the administering 
agency for the program’s implementation. Instead, because the program 
was “wildly successful,”197 its costs rapidly escalated beyond the state’s
budgetary capacity.198 In addition, because applicants claim the tax credits
over several years199 and the program lacked an overall budgetary cap,200 
195.  H.B. 3201, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
196. Id.; see generally, e.g., Tax Credits, Tax Equity and Alternatives To Spur Clean
Energy Financing, U.S. PARTNERSHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN. (2011), http://uspref. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Tax-Credits-Tax-Equity-for-Clean-Energy-Financing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T4MQ-M3BW].
197. House Chamber Floor Debate, 2009 Leg., 75th Sess., (Or. May 11, 2009), http:// 
oregon.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=7193 [https://perma.cc/Y6JH-BD25] (statement 
of Rep. Barnhart, calling the expansions in 2007 “wildly successful” at bringing new
industries to the state). 
198. Over both the 2007–2009 and 2009–2011 biennia, the BETC program cost over 
$40 million more than projected. 2011-2013 Tax Expenditure Report, OR. DEP’T REVENUE
183 (2010) (reporting an actual revenue impact for 2009-2011 of $185 million); 2009­
2011 Tax Expenditure Report, OR. DEP’T REVENUE 178 (2008) (reporting an actual revenue 
impact for 2007-2009 of $68.6 million and a projected revenue impact for 2009-2011 of 
$143.8 million); 2007-2009 Tax Expenditure Report, OR. DEP’T REVENUE 178 (2006) (reporting 
a projected revenue impact for 2007-2009 of $23 million). Given the legislature’s scrabbling
attempts to correct course, and higher projections than actual costs in later years, the program
eventually cost the state only $59.5 million more total than projected, or approximately
$7.4 million each year. 2015-2017 Tax Expenditure Report, OR. DEP’T REVENUE 157, 185 
(2014); 2013-2015 Tax Expenditure Report, OR. DEP’T REVENUE 156, 186 (2012); 2011­
2013 Tax Expenditure Report, OR. DEP’T REVENUE 183 (2010); 2009-2011 Tax Expenditure 
Report, OR. DEP’T REVENUE 178 (2008); 2007-2009 Tax Expenditure Report, OR. DEP’T 
REVENUE 178 (2006).
199. Unlike most government expenditures, a tax credit program does not fit neatly
into a projected budget. The government pays for the program through the tax revenue it
forgoes when participants apply a tax credit to reduce their taxes owed to the state. Without 
a clear limit on how many tax credits may be awarded (a limit the BETC program frequently
lacked), the costs of a tax credit program may easily surpass expectations, even due to
seemingly positive factors such as higher-than-expected participation rates.
200. The Oregon 1999 legislature eliminated the program-wide budgetary cap. 1999 
Or. Laws 966 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 469B.142 (2015)) (eliminating 
the program’s cap). 
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the 2007 changes created a path dependency wherein neither the legislature 
nor the agency201 could correct course once credits were lawfully awarded. 
Following intense controversy over the program’s poor implementation
and unexpectedly high costs, and despite repeated legislative attempts to 
remedy the program,202 the legislature finally sunset the program in 2011 
and 2012,203 though its costs will linger until 2022.204  While renewable energy
development benefitted from the strong price signal sent by the BETC, 
legislators’ failure to design a sustainable incentive program has eroded political 
support for new economic incentives. 
In fact, the RETC, an essential program for rooftop solar deployment, 
is scheduled to sunset at the end of 2017.205 Lawmakers have not assessed 
how the sunset will affect the industry. While a two-year extension of the 
program is reportedly on the table,206 the extension would serve as a stopgap
measure that fails to address the larger structural impediments to a clean
energy economy.
b. The Renewable Portfolio Standard
Like many states, Oregon has a Renewable Portfolio Standard.207 Enacted
in 2007, Oregon’s RPS required its large utilities to obtain 25% of the electricity 
they sell from renewable energy sources by 2025, with additional interim 
targets.208 In 2016, S.B. 1547 extended the RPS, requiring large utilities
201. One issue hampering ODOE’s control in 2007 through 2010 was the lack of a 
“claw back” provision for the agency to reclaim tax credits from a failed project. See Business
Energy Tax Credit: February 2010 Recommendations, OR. DEP’T ENERGY 6 (2009). 
202. H.B. 4079, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016); H.B. 3672, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Or. 2011); H.B. 3680, 75th Leg., Special Sess. (Or. 2009); H.B. 2472, 75th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2009) (this bill was vetoed by the governor and thus not enacted); H.B. 3619,
74th Leg., Special Sess. (Or. 2008). 
203. H.B 4079, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2012); H.B. 3672, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Or. 2011); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 315.357 (2015). 
204. See supra note 198. 
205. OR. REV. STAT. § 469B.103 (2017). 
206. Pete Danko, Oregon Solar Industry Calls RETC Extension Top 2017 Priority, and
Signs of Support Emerge, PORTLAND BUS. J. (Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
portland/news/2016/11/23/oregon-solar-industry-calls-retc-extension-top.html [https://perma.cc/
TPP2-X9YR].
207. See, e.g., State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L COUNCIL ST.
LEGISLATURES (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/RW67-DM68] (showing numerous states adopted RPSs prior to Oregon). 
208. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 469A.050, 469A.010 (2017). 
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to obtain 50% by 2040.209 While Oregon’s RPS has promoted renewable 
energy deployment, the RPS also contains several limiting factors that 
threaten to weaken the status of renewable energy and to suppress near-
term renewable energy growth. 
First, notwithstanding the 2016 expansion, Oregon’s RPS still suffers 
from a lack of ambition. Although a 50% by 2040 standard may seem 
aggressive when compared to other state mandates, Oregon’s own rate of 
renewable energy growth reveals the tepid nature of the RPS. The 2016 
extension requires the same rate of deployment through 2040,210 despite
significant market changes that could facilitate faster deployment of renewable 
energy sources, such as falling costs, technological advancements, and an
increased understanding of how to integrate renewable energy sources. 
Additionally, by requiring 50% of electricity to come from eligible renewables,
the RPS allows utilities to procure additional power from fossil fuel resources. 
If Oregon utilities respond to the RPS by investing in new natural gas
facilities, Oregon ratepayers may be accountable for stranded costs down 
the road, if Oregon lawmakers adopt aggressive greenhouse gas emissions
reductions mandates in the future.
Another flaw in Oregon’s RPS is that it allows for the indefinite banking
of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).211 Indefinite banking allows utilities
to stockpile RECs when renewable energy production exceeds regulatory
demand, such as during an economic downturn or during a boom in
renewable energy development. The stockpile decreases the utilities’ need for
RECs, thus dampening the market for new renewable energy sources. In
2016, Oregon took some measures to stop indefinite banking, but it also
grandfathered in some indefinite RECs, including any issued before March
2016 and many of those generated before 2023.212 Due to the REC banking 
rules in Oregon’s RPS, Oregon’s utilities projected they would have no 
need to invest in new renewable resources until approximately 2025.213 
209.  S.B. 1547, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016). 
210. Instead of requiring 25% over 18 years (2007–2025), the revised RPS calls for 
an additional 25% over 15 years (2025–2040). Three years’ difference does not adequately
account for likely market changes already present and likely to continue and accelerate
over the next 23 years. 
211. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 469A.130, 469A.140 (2017); OR. ADMIN. R. § 330­
160.0005 (2017). RECs are an administrative tool used to demonstrate compliance with 
the RPS. A REC represents a unit of renewable energy production, typically one MWh per
REC. 
212.  S.B. 1547, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016). 
213. Renewable Portfolio Standard Or. Implementation Plan 2017 through 2021, 
PACIFICORP, UM 1790 at 5 (July 15, 2016), http://edocs.puc.state.or.us/efdocs/HAA/um
1790haa112016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AYH-DY44]; see Petition for a Partial Waiver of
Competitive Bidding Guidelines and Approval of RFP Schedule, In re Portland Gen. Elec. 
Co., Request for Proposals for Renewable Resources, OR. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, No.
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Finally, the RPS does not adequately support a diverse portfolio of renewable 
energy sources. Historically, the RPS largely benefited only wind, the
cheapest eligible source.214 Additionally, because of transmission availability
combined with good resource value, the wind development has concentrated
in the Columbia Gorge.215 As a result of this concentration of resource type
and geographic location, the grid suffers potential instability.216 The revised 
RPS does nothing to address the grid’s potential instability, even though 
doing so would ease grid integration challenges and spread the economic
benefits of renewable energy development across the state. As a whole,
the RPS does not provide a strong enough market signal to develop 
renewables at the pace required to respond to climate change. Nor does it
include a strategy for integrating renewables on a large scale across the
state. Rather, the RPS focuses only on creating a demand-driven market
mechanism for some renewable development. 
c. Solar Capacity Standard 
To provide clearer support for solar, Oregon created a solar capacity
standard—or solar carve-out—in 2009.217 This policy required the state’s
investor-owned utilities to incorporate 20 MW of solar PV capacity by 
2020.218 The policy required that no project exceed 5 MW in installed 
capacity; for projects up to 500 kW, the policy allowed a REC multiplier 
of 2:1, giving twice as many RECs as the RPS ordinarily would.219 
The solar carve-out provided critical support for solar, until Oregon repealed 
and replaced it in 2016 with other provisions, such as the community solar
UM 1773 4 (May 4, 2016), http://edocs.puc.state.or.us/efdocs/HAA/haa16267.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ALS2-V8HN].
214. Renewables Portfolio Standards Resources, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
https://emp.lbl.gov/projects/renewables-portfolio [https://perma.cc/YF4Z-Z53S] (“Wind 
energy has been the primary form (64%) of all RPS-driven RE capacity growth to-date.”). 
Note this analysis considers multiple states, some of which have carve-outs requiring
a percentage come from specific resources, such as solar. This percentage may therefore 
underestimate wind’s dominance to date. 
215. E.g., Ted Sickinger, Too Much of a Good Thing: Growth in Wind Power Makes




217. H.B. 3039, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009) (repealed by S.B. 1547, 78th Leg., 
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program discussed below.220 Oregon conducted no assessment of whether
the replacement would provide meaningful support to solar developers. 
d. Net Metering
In Oregon, roughly 10,000 solar PV projects with a combined capacity
of more than 80 MW have been installed under the state’s net metering
program.221 Despite driving a substantial portion of Oregon’s solar development, 
Oregon lawmakers have not developed a long-term strategy for net metering 
in the state. Oregon’s net metering program contains an individual system 
size cap222 and an overall programmatic cap,223 both of which limit the 
benefits that net metering can provide to a constrained transmission
system.224 The caps are presumably in place to limit the impact of net 
metering on the utility business model and to limit the potential of cost
shifting from wealthy homeowners to low-income ratepayers that cannot
afford to install a net metered energy system or are otherwise limited from 
doing so.225 However, Oregon has not conducted an assessment of the
system-wide benefits of net metering to determine whether the caps are 
220.  S.B. 1547, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016). 
221. HB 2941: Solar Incentives Report, Report to the Legislative Assembly, PUBLIC 
UTIL. COMMISSION OR. 19 (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.puc.state.or.us/electric_gas/2016%
20HB%202941%20Solar%20Incentives%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L57M-FEHU];
See generally Background Brief on Or. Renewable Energy Resources, LEGIS. COMMITTEE 
SERVICES 4 (2014), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/citizen_engagement/Reports/BB2014 
OregonRenewableEnergy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4649-NSB3].
222. OR. REV. STAT. § 757.300 (2017) (setting the residential net metering cap at 25 
kW per customer generator); OR. ADMIN. R. §§ 860-039-0010 (2017) (setting the non­
residential net metering cap at 2 MW per customer generator). 
223. OR. REV. STAT. § 757.300. The programmatic cap is not a hard cap but rather
allows the PUC to determine whether to remove the interconnection requirement that the 
net metering statute places on utilities when the aggregated net-metered systems account
for 0.5% of a utility’s historic single-hour peak load. Thus far, the PUC has not determined 
the cap necessary and utilities are still required to interconnect net metered systems that 
comply with applicable specifications. See, HB 2941: Solar Incentives Report, Report to 
the Legislative Assembly, PUBLIC UTIL. COMMISSION OR. 19 (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www. 
puc.state.or.us/electric_gas/2016%20HB%202941%20Solar%20Incentives%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L57M-FEHU] (noting that as of the end of 2015, PGE’s net metering 
customers account for 1.05% of historic single-hour peak-load and PacifiCorp’s net metering
customers account for 1.36% of the utility’s historic single-hour peak-load.) http://www.
puc.state.or.us/electric_gas/2016%20HB%202941%20Solar%20Incentives%20Report.pdf.
224. See Mike Rogoway, Prineville is Running Out of Electricity, Jeopardizing New 
Manufacturing Jobs, OREGONIAN (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.oregonlive.com/silicon-forest/ 
index.ssf/2017/01/prineville_is_running_out_of_e.html [https://perma.cc/35JR-2ZXC].
225. See generally Pete Danko, Oregon Utility Commission Taps the Brakes on Solar 
Proposals, SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS OREGON, Aug. 31, 2016 available at http://www.bizjournals 
.com/portland/blog/sbo/2016/08/oregon-utility-commission-taps-the-brakes-on-solar.html 
(noting that utilities have been pushing PUCs to weaken net metering policies in several
Western states by characterizing the policies as regressive subsidies). 
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serving this purpose. Furthermore, Oregon’s net metering law does not 
authorize virtual net metering, which would allow homeowners without 
sufficient solar access or renters to offset their electricity consumption
with energy produced offsite through community solar arrays.226 In short, 
Oregon’s net metering program has seemingly not been designed to achieve 
clear goals or purposes that other parts of Oregon’s energy laws deem desirable.
e. Oregon’s Implementation of PURPA
Enacted as federal law in 1978, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act (PURPA)227 obligates utilities to purchase electricity generated by small 
power producers from qualifying resources,228 such as wind and solar.229 
Though a federal statute, PURPA maintains a primary role for states to
implement the law.230 In Oregon between 1979 and early 2016, only three
projects representing 2.6 MW of capacity were installed under PURPA.231 
Renewable energy developers have cited numerous shortcomings in Oregon’s
implementation of PURPA, in addition to economic considerations, to
explain why the law failed to meaningfully encourage renewable energy
development in Oregon over that period of time.232 However, despite the
administrative roadblocks, the falling costs of solar created an economic 
incentive that briefly spurred a dramatic rise in the number of PURPA 
contracts in Oregon. By April 2016, 59 additional contracts were signed 
for more than 430 MWs of solar PV capacity.233
 226. See generally Powers et al., supra note 160, at 49 (noting that Oregon’s net-metering
law fails to authorize virtual net metering, a legal tool that would allow homeowners
without sufficient solar access or renters to offset their electricity consumption with energy
produced offsite). 
227. Act of Nov. 9, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 115-22)).
228.  16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (2012). 
229.  18 CFR § 292.204(b). 
230.  16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) (2012). 
231. See HB 2941: Solar Incentives Report, supra note 221, at A-7. 
232. E.g., Letter from David W. Brown, Obsidian Renewables, LLC., to Representative 
Jessica Vega Pederson, Chair, House Comm. on Energy & Env’t, State of Or. (May 24, 2016)
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015I1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/90655 
(citing a lack of transparency, few opportunities for public comment, onerous barriers to
participation even for market participants, and frequent rule changes that undermined the 
ability of project developers to plan and finance projects as reasons why the law was failing
to promote renewable energy development.) [https://perma.cc/8KVR-A3DS]. 
233. Id.
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Just as the law was beginning to perform as intended, by bringing renewable 
energy projects online, the PUC revised its rules that implement PURPA 
to limit the economic feasibility of qualifying projects. In response to
utilities’ requests, the PUC lowered the capacity threshold of eligible facilities 
from 10 MW to 3 MW.234 Now, facilities larger than 3 MW must negotiate
contracts with utilities on a case-by-case basis, an arrangement that subjects
the renewable power producer to the monopsony bargaining power of the 
utilities. 
Utility opposition to PURPA is rooted in similar fears as utility opposition 
to net metering. The utilities fear losing their rate base and suggest that
the grid is incapable of integrating the intermittent renewable resources.235 
Similar to its handling of complaints about net metering by the utilities, 
the Oregon PUC scaled back the efficacy of PURPA by imposing unnecessary 
limitations. This PUC action represents a quick fix aimed at assuaging the
utilities’ immediate concerns, but once again fails to address structural barriers 
that hinder a transition to a renewable energy economy. 
3. Oregon’s Mixed Results from Complex Policies Seeking 
to Control Emissions 
Oregon’s emissions reductions laws and policies have likewise achieved
mixed success. As noted above, Oregon’s emissions standards for new
coal-fired power plants have effectively prevented investment in or construction
of new coal-fired power plants. However, other emissions reductions programs
have had much less success. Finally, the efficacy of some programs remains
to be seen. 
a. Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Goals 
Like many countries and states, Oregon recognized the need for an 
economy-wide target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Instead of 
following the examples set by states like California and Connecticut, which 
both set binding targets with regulatory support, Oregon instead adopted
aspirational goals.236 In 2007, Oregon declared the state’s goals for greenhouse
gas emissions to plateau by 2020, fall to 10% below 1990 levels by 2020, 
234. Krysti Shallenberger, Oregon PUC Rejects PacifiCorp Bid to Trim PURPA
Contracts, UTILITY DIVE, Mar. 31, 2016, available at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/
oregon-puc-rejects-pacificorp-bid-to-trim-purpa-contracts/416627/. 
235. See, e.g., Elisabeth Grarry & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean
a Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2014). 
236. Energy Regulation in the States: A Wake-up Call, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. 3–7, 
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/media/pdf/statereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3EG-UAFJ].
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and fall to at least 75% below 1990 levels by 2050.237 While the state was
able to meet its 2010 goal (largely as a result of the slowdown in emissions 
occurring during the recession), current forecasts predict Oregon will not 
meet its future goals.238 Under Oregon’s current policies, the state will exceed 
its 2020 goal by almost 11 million metric tons of CO2e and its 2050 goal by
more than 40 million metric tons of CO2e.239 With aspirational goals and no 
regulatory agency to enforce them,240 Oregon has failed to establish
consequences for high emitters’ noncompliance. Instead, the consequences of
high emissions and climate change will fall on the public and future 
generations. 
b. Emission Standard for New Natural Gas Plants 
In 1997, Oregon created the Carbon Dioxide Emissions Standard to 
restrict emissions from new natural gas plants,241 the first such standard in 
the United States.242 Under this policy, new natural gas plants must emit 
no more than 0.675 pounds of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour of net 
electricity output, or obtain offsets.243 Offsets, such as those in the international
Clean Development Mechanism244 or under the Clean Air Act’s Non-
Attainment New Source Review program,245 excuse a facility for failing 
to comply so long as the facility pays for its emissions to be offset by
237. H.B. 3543, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§
468A.200–260 (2015)). 




 240. See generally id. (discussing the Oregon Global Warming Commission and its 
lack of regulatory authority). 
241. OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503 (2017). 
242. See History of the Climate Trust, CLIMATE TR., https://www.climatetrust.org/ 
about/history/ [https://perma.cc/K3JF-6Y8F] (last visited Apr. 16, 2017). 
243. OR. ADMIN. R. § 345-024-0550 (2017). The statutory rate was originally 0.70 
pounds per kWh, but it allows adjustment by the implementing agency. OR. REV. STAT. §
469.503. 
244. See, e.g., Carbon Market, International Offset Mechanisms Critical in Meeting
Climate Change Challenge, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http:// 
unfccc.int/press/news_room/newsletter/in_focus/items/4553.php 
[https://perma.cc/HY97-B8AQ] (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). 
245. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7503(c) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 115-22); see also
Permit Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(a)(9) (2016). 
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reductions elsewhere.246 Even assuming the efficacy of offsets as a general 
matter, Oregon’s offset program under the CO2 Emissions Standard is a 
clear example of a poorly thought out market mechanism that undermines 
rather than furthers emissions reductions goals. 
Under Oregon’s offset program, legislators and regulators, rather than 
the market, establish the price for offsets.247 Moreover, utilities must pay 
the price of offsets through a one-time upfront payment based on utility
projections of future CO2 emissions.248 If the fee falls short of actual costs
of offsets, if the utilities emit more CO2 than projected, or if the offset
projects fail, utilities have no obligation to obtain more offsets or pay a 
higher price.
Oregon set the original fee amount too low and provided an inadequate 
means for increasing it. The statute originally set the offset fee at $0.57 
per ton of emissions. The Energy Facility Siting Council (EFSC) may
change the fee amount by no more than 50 percent in any two-year period
and only if EFSC makes a finding that the resulting fee is “economically
achievable” for new plants.249 Since 1997, the EFSC has increased the fee
to only $1.27 per ton,250 an amount that is not sufficient to cover the
administrative costs of running the program. It costs the Climate Trust,
the nonprofit organization authorized to provide emission offsets,251 an 
average of $4.32 to offset each metric ton.252 Therefore, less than 30% of 
the offsets authorized by the program are actually purchased through the
fee, vastly undermining the carbon reduction efficacy of the program.
Because the fee is too low, all new natural gas-fired power plants in 
Oregon have opted to pay the compliance fee rather than achieve the emissions 
reductions or forgo building new natural gas plants.253 Additionally, the
one-time charge does not contain a reopener that would allow EFSC to
revisit the compliance payment as more is learned about the costs of 
greenhouse gas pollution. Therefore, not only does the offset mechanism 
discourage investment in pollution control technologies and fail to obtain 
the requisite amount of offsets, it creates a perverse incentive for new
 246. 
247. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503(2)(c)(C). 
Id.





Id.; OR. ADMIN. R. § 345-024-0580 (2017). 
See CLIMATE TR., supra note 242. 
Id.
 253. See Plowing New Pathways: Developing Quality Offsets in a Maturing Markey, 
The Climate Trust’s Five-Year Report to the Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council, 
CLIMATE TR. (Oct. 2014), https://www.climatetrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2014­
Oregon-5-Year-Report-EMAIL-141117-CAM-FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ7Y-HMA7]. 
106
     
 
   
 
  
     


















    
  
POWERS2 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2017 11:04 AM 
[VOL. 8:  67, 2016–17] Quick Fixes or Real Remedies? 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW
facilities to come online sooner and lock-in the low compliance fee.254 A 
poorly designed policy, Oregon’s CO2 Emissions Standard does not actually
offset the carbon emissions of new natural gas facilities, provides a funding
structure for the Climate Trust that is dependent on new natural gas facilities 
coming online, and encourages the development of new natural gas facilities 
sooner rather than later to lock-in low offset prices.
c. Emission Standards for Coal-fired Power Plants 
Although Oregon laws restricting investment in and construction of 
new coal-fired power plants have succeeded due to their clarity and 
simplicity, it is less clear if Oregon’s efforts to eliminate imports of power
from existing coal-plants will succeed. Oregon receives roughly 33% of
its electricity from coal.255 In an attempt to eliminate Oregon’s reliance on 
coal-based electricity imported from outside the state, Oregon passed SB 
1547 in 2016, which requires that “[o]n or before January 1, 2030, an
electric company shall eliminate coal-fired resources from its allocation 
of electricity.”256 This does not require the two investor-owned utilities
subject to the law to actually eliminate their usage of coal; instead, it
requires them to eliminate coal resources from their retail rates.257 In 
addition, the definition of “coal-fired resource” exempts “electricity that 
is included as part of a limited duration wholesale power purchase made
by an electric company for immediate delivery to retail electricity consumers 
that are located in this state for which the source of the power is not 
known.”258 This means that the utilities may still purchase wholesale coal-
fired power on a short-term basis to meet demand in Oregon. Oregon’s 
attempt to eliminate coal-based imports does not directly prohibit the use
or sale of coal-based electricity into Oregon. Instead, by altering the
ratemaking treatment of coal-based power, the law hopes to send market
signals that eliminate the use of coal in other states. Whether it will achieve 
that aim remains to be seen. 
254. See generally OR. DEP’T ENERGY, supra note 167, at 5 (noting that there are new 
thermal gas plants being proposed in Oregon). 
255. OR. DEP’T ENERGY, supra note 167, at 20. 
256.  S.B. 1547 § 1(2), 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016). 
257. Id. § 1(1)(a) (defining “allocation of electricity” as “for the purpose of setting
electricity rates, the costs and benefits associated with the resources used to provide electricity
to an electric company’s retail electricity consumers that are located in this state.”).
258. Id. § 1(1)(b).
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In addition to the laws examined above, Oregon has many other climate 
and energy laws and policies. Yet, despite the abundance of laws, Oregon’s
progress on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and transitioning from 
fossil fuels has been weak. As a general rule, the simpler laws seem to achieve 
clearer results. Where the state’s laws become more complicated, and
particularly where they inject market mechanisms such as banked RECs
and monetary offsets into the regulatory scheme, their performance diminishes. 
These dynamics are consistent with the critiques of fast policy. They should
also, however, be expected when one considers Oregon’s fragmented energy
and climate governance system, discussed next. 
B. Oregon’s Climate and Energy Administration
Climate change mitigation and adaptation, by nature, requires the efforts 
of a broad range of sectors. From transportation, to agriculture, to forestry,
to electricity regulation, to land use planning, to housing and beyond, there is
no single governmental agency equipped to respond effectively and
comprehensively to the challenges posed by climate change. Like most
states, Oregon’s energy and environmental governance responsibilities are
spread among multiple agencies that serve distinct yet overlapping functions.
Oregon has taken steps to gather information, develop strategies to respond
to climate change, and to harmonize efforts across agencies, but these efforts 
have not been enough to develop an effective governance structure to respond 
to the scale of the challenge. 
Oregon has undertaken numerous efforts to increase the amount of
information available about climate change and clean energy in the state 
of Oregon.259 Most noticeably, in 2007, Oregon created the Oregon Global
Warming Commission (OGWC) to “recommend ways to coordinate state 
and local efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” and to “recommend
efforts to help Oregon prepare for the effects of global warming.”260 The
OGWC is directed to study global warming, make recommendations on 
ways to coordinate state and local efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
conduct public outreach, and report to the legislature every odd-numbered
259. In the same legislation that created the OGWC, Oregon created the Oregon
Climate Change Research Institute to conduct research and serve as a clearinghouse on
climate change information. The OCCRI is set up within the Oregon University System. 
H.B. 3543, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). The OCCRI has run into similar funding 
problems as the OGWC. In 2015 the Oregon legislature passed legislation that directed
the PUC to evaluate Oregon’s solar PV incentive programs and provide recommendations. 
H.B. 2941, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015). 
260. H.B. 3543, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); see also About the Commission, 
OR. GLOBAL WARMING COMMISSION, http://www.keeporegoncool.org/content/oregon-global­
warming-commission [https://perma.cc/U2CP-RRPD] (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
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year regarding Oregon’s progress toward achieving its emissions reduction 
goals.261 While the OGWC is empowered to study and report on the effects 
of climate change, it is not empowered to write substantive regulations,
does not have enforcement authority, and is not funded. OGWC members 
serve on a volunteer basis, and the organizational structure of the OGWC 
is an unwieldy 25 members.262 OGWC has been forced to seek funds from
private sources such as grants and in-kind contributions from local professionals 
in order to create its website and conduct its information gathering and 
outreach functions.263 Despite its organizational and funding challenges, 
OGWC has succeeded in publishing several reports.264 
In 2009, the legislature directed the Environmental Quality Commission
(EQC) to create a reporting and registry program for the import, sale, 
allocation, or distribution of electricity or fossil fuels that emit GHGs.265 
The legislature authorized the EQC to establish fees for air quality permittees
to fund the program.266 The EQC made the program applicable to entities
that emit more than 2,500 metric tons of CO2 per year and fit within a
source-type category such as solid waste disposal facilities, wastewater 
treatment facilities, fuel importers, IOUs, consumer-owned utilities, and 
natural gas suppliers.267 EQC’s GHG reporting program takes the critical 
first step of getting regulated entities accustomed to monitoring, recording,
and reporting their greenhouse gas emissions and provides important, 
quantified information for decisions going forward.
In 2011, then-governor John Kitzhaber convened a task force to develop 
a 10-Year Energy Action Plan.268 Released in 2012, the Plan identified 
three primary goals: meeting 100% of electric load growth through energy
261. H.B. 3543, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); see also Powers et al., supra note 
160, at 8.
262. Powers et al., supra note 160, at 6. 
263. Id. at 9. 
264. See, e.g., Preparing Oregon’s Fish, Wildlife, and Habitat for Future Climate 
Change: A Guide for State Adaption Efforts, OR. GLOBAL WARMING COMMISSION (2008),
http://www.defenders.org/publications/oregon_adaptation_efforts.pdf [https://perma.cc/JX2D­
U47U]; Roadmap To 2020, OR. GLOBAL WARMING COMMISSION (2010), http://www.keep
oregoncool.org/sites/default/files/Integrated_OGWC_Interim_Roadmap_to_2020_Oct29_ 
11-19Additions.pdf [https://perma.cc/68AR-5XEZ].
265. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 468A.270, 468A.280 (2017). 
266. Id. § 468A.315. 
267. OR. ADMIN. R. §§ 340-215-0010 (2017). 
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efficiency and conservation, removing finance and regulatory barriers to
clean energy infrastructure development, and accelerating the market transition
to a cleaner transportation system.269 Before significant progress could be
made on the plan, however, scandal took the wind out of Oregon’s clean
energy sails when Governor Kitzhaber resigned from office in 2015 amidst 
allegations of improper influence peddling resulting from his fiancée’s
dual role as First Lady and clean energy consultant.270 
Today, although the 10-Year Energy Action Plan remains in effect, Oregon 
lacks a strategic plan or a strategic planning agency to guide Oregon’s long- 
term climate mitigation and energy decarbonization process. Without a clearer 
governance structure and a designated agency leading Oregon’s efforts, it
is likely that Oregon will continue to muddle through with quick fixes, 
piecemeal strategies, and increasingly fast policies to address climate change 
and energy decarbonization. These approaches are not optimal ways for 
addressing the highly complex problems associated with climate change
and the elimination of fossil fuels. 
V. THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF QUICK FIXES AND FAST
 
CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICY
 
Oregon is certainly not the only state to use a quick fix or fast policy
approach to climate and energy policymaking. Indeed, many climate and
energy laws deployed by states have emerged from a fast policy framework, 
in which policies are developed, sanctioned, and then spread quickly and 
sometimes haphazardly. This fast policymaking process is not all bad, as
it can propagate the transfer of effective laws and create regulatory momentum 
for further action. However, fast policymaking in the climate and energy
sectors is also unlikely to address fundamental underlying impediments to 
decarbonization, and it may create new path dependencies that undermine 
climate mitigation efforts.  
This is not to say that fast climate and energy policies necessarily fail.
Indeed, some fast policies are simple and effective as designed. At other 
times, some fast policies ultimately become, with careful local tailoring, 
effective programs. Moreover, other benefits may emerge from fast climate 
and energy policy. However, as the next two sections describe, fast climate
and energy policy is often a mixed bag. 
269. 10-Year Energy Action Plan Modeling, OR. DEP’T ENERGY (July 30, 2012), https:// 
www.oregon.gov/energy/energy-oregon/Documents/2012%20Energy%20Action%20Plan%
20Modeling%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FDC-CKMC].
270. See Lee Van Der Voo & Kirk Johnson, Gov. John Kitzhaber of Oregon Resigns 
Amid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/us/kitzhaber­
resigns-as-governor-of-oregon.html [https://perma.cc/B4T9-9K8T]. 
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A. The Benefits of Fast Climate and Energy Policy 
Although fast policy approaches can carry several risks, they also offer 
certain benefits. First, states engaged in fast policy development can readily
transfer developed policies from other states without necessarily engaging 
in the expensive and time-consuming process of designing their own
policies from scratch. Taking advantage of these “political economies of
scale”271 accelerates the law-making process and thus potentially allows
effective policies to transfer quickly to other jurisdictions. Successful
passage of a popular law can then create the political will for policymakers 
to enact additional climate and energy laws, as success tends to beget success.272 
In addition, lawmakers that supported the original law may have sufficient 
buy-in to amend and improve the law if it appears to be operating 
inadequately.273 Some fast policies, moreover, may work as expected without 
additional tailoring or analysis and thus create certainty and desired
outcomes.274 Finally, fast policy mobility can lay the groundwork for regional
cooperation that may be essential to effective climate mitigation and energy
decarbonization.275 
1. The Ability to Enact Laws Quickly and Inexpensively
Fast policy presents an opportunity for policymakers to enact policies 
quickly and inexpensively by relying on the work of early-moving states 
or influential policy advocates.276 For states struggling to balance budgets
 271. David Leebron, An Analysis of Harmonization Claims, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 
308, 311–12 (Fall 1996). 
272. See generally Derek Walker, New Study: California’s Carbon Market Delivers 




274. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1105 (9th Cir. 2013). 
275. See, e.g., Jan Hamrin, REC Definitions and Tracking Mechanisms Used by State 
RPS Programs, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE 1 (2014), http://www.cesa.org/assets/
2014-Files/RECs-Attribute-Definitions-Hamrin-June-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRZ2­
G32B] (discussing interstate REC trading).
276. The rise and influence of the controversial entity, the American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC), may be attributed to state legislators’ need for ready-made legislation,
due to their own lack of time and resources. See, e.g., Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, ALEC 
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or citizen legislators who have full-time jobs outside of state government, 
the ability to benefit from these political economies of scale cannot be
overstated.277  In Oregon, for example, templates for many of the state’s
existing energy and climate policies, including the greenhouse gas goals,
some of the emissions standards requirements for fossil fuels, the state’s 
RPS, and several subsidy and incentive programs, all originated from
outside the state.278 The ability to import these laws into the state allowed 
Oregon to avoid much of the time and expense associated with designing 
from scratch its own regulatory programs. 
2. Political Will and Momentum 
Fast policy can also build political will and momentum to enact future 
climate and energy laws and, under some circumstances, to correct
shortcomings and close loopholes in existing laws. Many climate and energy 
laws receive strong public support once enacted.279 This support can carry
forward to encourage another round of climate and energy lawmaking, 
particularly when lawmakers and policy advocates engage in effective
outreach and messaging to celebrate the passage of a popular policy.280 
Once Oregon advocates’ efforts to pass the coal-to-clean energy legislation 
succeeded, they were then able to use that success to promote passage of 
other climate and energy laws during the 2017 legislative session.281 Policy
mobility can therefore lay the groundwork for states to continually enact
climate and energy legislation. Moreover, as leading states continue to 
AESR] (“In short, ALEC is successful because legislators in many states are pressed for 
time and have few resources for developing legislation – making ALEC’s pre-written model
bills, research assistance and policy expertise all the more appealing.”).
277. Id.
 278. See generally supra Part IV. Oregon’s emission standard for new natural-gas 
facilities was the first in the nation; otherwise, all the other policies had already been 
implemented elsewhere. Id.
 279. New Poll Shows Colorado Voters Supportive of Renewable Energy, AM. COUNCIL 
ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, http://www.acore.org/resources/news-media/press-releases/2714-new- 
poll-shows-colorado-voters-supportive-of-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/X89M-NQ5W]
(last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
280. See Brad Avakian & Jackie Dingfelder, Ignore the Naysayers and Pass the No-
Coal Bill (Opinion), OREGONIAN (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/ 
2016/02/ignore_the_naysayers_and_pass.html [https://perma.cc/QZ4E-SR3B] (urging Oregon
legislators to build on the success of its original RPS by passing the coal-to-clean legislation 
and pointing out the economic benefit and jobs growth from the original legislation). 
281. See generally James Cronin, Overshadowed Legislation Incentivizes Utility-Scale 
Solar in Oregon, PORTLAND BUS. J. (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/ 
sbo/2016/03/overshadowed-legislation-incentivizes-utility.html [https://perma.cc/HR3K­
Y3Q2] (noting that HB 4037 helps incentivize solar production in Oregon that would help
meet the mandate for SB 1547). 
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upgrade their own laws, advocates in later-moving states can use those 
upgrades to justify continued policy improvements.282 
In addition, fast policymaking can lead to necessary policy reforms
once climate and energy laws are on the books. Fast policy allows states
to readily import policy ideas from other jurisdictions. If it turns out that 
the imported policies are not adequately suited to the state, policymakers
can make legislative amendments or rely on regulatory agencies to correct
the design flaws.283 The initial sponsors of the fast policy laws would
presumably have personal stake in the laws’ success to be willing to advocate 
for the necessary adjustments. Fast policy can thus ensure that lawmakers
have skin in the game, which will encourage them to cultivate the laws’ 
success.
3. Certainty Associated from Clear Requirements
Some fast policies can achieve success because of the clarity they create. 
Policy imports that create simple and unambiguous requirements may
work effectively regardless of any local tailoring. In addition, states may
benefit from legal certainty established in lawsuits challenging policies 
enacted by early adopters of climate and energy laws.284 
Relatively simple and discrete laws may be ideally suited to quick policy 
transfers. For example, a law banning construction of any new coal-fired 
power plant within a state would create an unambiguous mandate that could 
be implemented relatively easily without further local analysis or rulemaking. 
This type of law would also likely fit within the state’s exercise of traditional
 282. See generally Robert Walton, New Mexico Lawmakers Propose Expanding RPS 
to 80% by 2040, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-mexico- 
lawmakers-propose-expanding-rps-to-80-by-2040/435425/ [https://perma.cc/PM2J-N23V]
(describing New Mexico’s proposal of 80% renewable energy by 2040 fitting within Hawaii’s
target of 100% renewable energy by 2045 and California’s target of 50% renewable energy
by 2030). 
283. See generally Herman K. Trabish, Inside California’s Plans to Jump-Start Community
Solar Development, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/inside­
californias-plans-to-jump-start-community-solar-development/370218/ [https://perma.cc/
7JZ8-LTCW] (describing the CPUC’s implementing process for community solar in California
and how it is, in part, modeled off efforts in Minnesota and California that have withheld
legal challenges).
284. See Anne Havemann, Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square 
its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal Constitution, 71 MD. L. REV. 848, 850–52
(2012) (describing how Maryland can adjust its RPS based on the litigation experiences of
other states in defending their RPSs). 
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state police powers and thus raise fewer legal questions than a law with
broader interstate effects.285 As another example, laws requiring state and
local agencies to procure materials that meet certain efficiency standards 
could operate effectively without much local tinkering and would readily 
fit within the government’s ability to regulate itself as a market participant.286 
Although laws that appear simple could nonetheless face practical and
legal complications, fast policy seems particularly well suited to discrete 
mandates that arise under traditional state authority.
States may also benefit from importing laws that have survived legal
challenges in other jurisdictions. Most notably, the Clean Air Act encourages
interstate policy transfers in its vehicle emissions standards program.
Under the Clean Air Act, states are generally preempted from establishing
their own vehicle emissions standards.287 However, if California receives 
a waiver from the Environmental Protection Agency to enact its own
standards, other states may adopt the California standards as well.288 Indeed, 
Oregon has adopted many California standards.289 Any legal challenge to
the California waiver would occur under the Clean Air Act’s judicial review 
provisions, and once a court upholds the California waiver, other states 
would likely not face similar preemption lawsuits.290 Thus, California’s
vehicle emissions standards are specifically adapted to interstate transfers.291
 285. See, e.g., Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n v. Davis, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001), aff’d, 331 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting states enjoy “great latitude under 
their police powers to legislate” to protect, among other things, the public health and 
environment, and dismissing a challenge to California’s ban on a gasoline additive where 
the ban sought to reduce the risk of groundwater contamination). For more on state police 
powers generally, see, e.g., Brian W. Ohm, Some Modern Day Musings on the Police Power, 
47 URB. LAW. 625 (2015). 
286. See, e.g., Engine Mfr.’s Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Maint. Dist., 498 F.3d 
1031, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying the market participant doctrine to uphold
California’s requirement that government vehicle fleets meet certain standards, including
fuel efficiency standards). For more on the market participant doctrine generally, see, e.g., 
David S. Bogen, The Market Participant Doctrine and the Clear Statement Rule, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543 (2006). 
287.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7543 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 115-22). 
288. Id.; see also, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfr.’s Ass’n v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. 
Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 524–25 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the Clean Air Act’s waiver
provision for California and how it allows other states, such as New York, to “piggy-back” 
onto California’s standards so long as both states follow the proper procedures). 
289. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-257-0050 (2017) (listing the California standards 
which Oregon has adopted). 
290. See, e.g., Motor & Equip. Mfr.’s Ass’n v. E.P.A., 627 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(upholding the Environmental Protection Agency’s grant of a waiver to California under 
§ 7543).
291. In recognizing other states may prefer to adopt California’s standards over the 
federal baseline, Congress structured the opt-in provisions to best facilitate policy adoption
while limiting any negative impacts on the interstate market from having multiple 
standards. See Motor Vehicle Mfr.’s Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 527 (“It was in an effort to assist 
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States may also benefit from the legal certainty associated with importing 
policies that have survived dormant Commerce Clause challenges within
the same circuit for the U.S. Court of Appeals and avoiding policies that 
fail these challenges.292 The dormant Commerce Clause has become a key 
tool for opponents of climate and energy policies, casting a pall on states’
ability to enact certain types of laws.293 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits upheld 
state climate and energy laws against dormant Commerce Clause challenges,294 
while the Seventh Circuit impugned a facially discriminatory RPS295 and 
a judge on the Eighth Circuit voted to strike down a Minnesota emissions 
standard on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.296 Until the Supreme Court 
clarifies its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the circuit courts’
decisions provide some legal clarity for states seeking to import climate
and energy policies from states within the same appellate jurisdiction. 
This enabled Oregon, for example, to rely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision
upholding California’s low-carbon fuel standard when Oregon imported 
the same standard.297 In the increasingly litigious environment surrounding 
those states struggling to meet federal pollution standards that Congress . . . directed in 1977 
that other states could . . . ‘piggyback’ . . . this opt-in authority . . . is carefully circumscribed to
avoid placing an undue burden on the automobile manufacturing industry.”). 
292. Whereas the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers the federal
government to regulate interstate commerce, courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause 
to implicitly restrict states from regulating interstate commerce, an interpretation known
as the Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing
Dormant Commerce Clause Review for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 
155–56 (2015). The Dormant Commerce Clause thus aims to prevent states from engaging 
in economic protectionism and either discriminating against out-of-state actors or otherwise
impermissibly burdening interstate commerce. Id. For further discussion of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause and its application to climate and energy laws, see id. at 155–70. 
293. See generally James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1357 (2014) (noting that state action on climate change is critical but 
often hampered by legal challenges under the Dormant Commerce Clause); Steven Ferrey,
Carbon Outlasts the Law: States Walk the Constitutional Line, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 309 (2014) (discussing how state energy laws are in legal jeopardy). 
294. Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015); 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013). 
295.  Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. F.E.R.C., 721 F.3d 764, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2013). 
296.  North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 913 (8th Cir. 2016). 
297. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1277 (D. 
Or. 2015) (finding any claim of facial discrimination barred by Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union). Commentators noted that the plaintiffs in Oregon faced an “uphill battle” to
combat the precedent from the California standard. Keith Goldberg, Challenge to Ore. 
Fuel Standards is a Legal Long Shot, LAW360 (Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.law360.com/ 
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state climate and energy policies, legal certainty offers a clear benefit to
states engaged in fast policy. 
4. Laying the Groundwork for Regional Cooperation
Finally, in the absence of national leadership or collaborative regional 
policymaking, fast policy design may facilitate the creation of regional 
climate and energy programs, such as regional emissions trading programs
and REC trading markets. Thus far in the United States, existing greenhouse
gas emissions trading programs have emerged either from a collaborative 
regional develop process—as in the case of the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative298—or at the state level—as with California’s cap-and-trade 
program.299 Many climate advocates and policymakers have supported 
expansion of these programs to create either a national emission trading
system300 or larger regional emissions trading markets.301 For example, in 
the mid-2000s, western states attempted to create a western greenhouse 
gas emissions program through an effort called the Western Climate
Initiative (“WCI”).302 At various points during the negotiation of the WCI,
it seemed possible that a majority of states in the West would join the
WCI.303 However, the WCI process lost momentum overtime.
The recommended market designs developed through the WCI, however,
remain relevant in those states that continue to pursue emissions trading, 
as does California’s existing emissions trading program. For example, in 
Oregon, state leaders and the Department of Environmental Quality have 
expressly modeled proposed state emissions trading designs off of the 
WCI and California’s program.304 In the event Oregon eventually passes 
its own greenhouse gas emissions trading program, its use of the WCI and 
Californian models should enable better regional integration.
articles/635007/challenge-to-ore-fuel-standards-is-a-legal-long-shot [https://perma.cc/DZM7-
U9UM].
298. See Program Overview, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.
rggi.org/design/overview [https://perma.cc/V2RM-SQ9W] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
299.  A.B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). 
300. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act (the “Waxman-Markey” climate
bill), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
301. See, e.g., Western Climate Initiative, Inc., WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, INC. 
http://www.wci-inc.org/ [https://perma.cc/59L6-FNRM] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
302. Brooks V. Rice, The “Triumph” of the Commons: An Analysis of Enforcement 
Problems and Solutions in the Western Climate Initiative, 22 PACIFIC MCGEORGE GLOBAL 
BUS. & DEV. L. J. 401, 402–03 (2010). 
303. Id. at 402–03. 
304. Considerations for Designing a Cap-and-Trade Program in Oregon, OR. DEP’T 
ENVTL. QUALITY 7 (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.oregon.gov/deq/FilterDocs/ghgmarket 
study.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RXK-USD3] (describing the agency’s report focused on the 
California and WCI models, per the legislative directive).
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Policy mobility has also enabled interstate REC markets to develop. A
majority of states that have enacted RPSs use RECs to measure compliance
and develop new markets for renewable resources.305 In most states, regulated 
utilities may use RECs produced from out-of-state sources to comply with at 
least a portion of their RPS mandates.306 However, because each state has
different rules regarding the types of energy that qualify for the RPS, the
attributes represented by RECs, and even the value that each REC represents,
regional REC tracking systems emerged to facilitate interstate REC trading.307 
The Western Renewable Energy Generation Information System enables
Oregon’s utilities, for example, to purchase RECs from across the west.308 
Although local adjustments to RPSs has complicated the REC markets, policy 
mobility enabled these markets to form in the first place. As more states enact 
or expand RPS programs, interstate markets may become even more important
in facilitating renewable energy development.
Fast policies have therefore had an important, and often positive, impact 
on climate mitigation and energy decarbonization. Indeed, during the
administrations of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, when the
federal government played a weak and even obstructionist role in mitigating
climate change, interstate policy mobility was essential to ensuring states 
began to address climate change and support renewable energy resources.
Moreover, these policy transfers helped create regional markets that could 
continue to grow, even under a new Trump Administration that appears 
hostile to climate science, much less effective climate change mitigation. 
It is difficult to imagine where U.S. greenhouse gas emissions would be
today without the leadership of and policy mobility between states. Thus, 
on many levels, fast climate and energy policy has yielded significant benefits.
B. The Limitations of Fast Climate and Energy Policy 
The benefits of fast climate and energy policy, however, do not necessarily 
mean that fast policy approaches are optimal for achieving climate mitigation 
and energy decarbonization. In reality, most successful policy transfers 
have involved relatively simple programs, such as RPSs or emissions 
prohibitions, that attempt to create or constrain markets through supply
and demand-side mandates. However, even these simple programs can 
305. Hamrin, supra note 275, at 1. 
306. Leon, supra note 156, at 6.
 307. Hamrin, supra note 275, at 4–10. 
308. See OR. ADMIN. R. § 330-160-0020 (2017). 
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quickly become complicated as states adjust imported policies to meet local 
needs, as mandates become more stringent, as incumbents push back against 
market changes, or as state policies increasingly impact interstate energy
markets.
Fast policy designs also often fail to consider or correct underlying 
structural, regulatory, or market problems that support the use of fossil fuels.
Fast policies can therefore lead to new path dependencies or produce stranded 
costs, which may promote expanded fossil fuel use. If imported state policies
fail to achieve the advertised benefits, this may lead to political backlashes 
or policy fatigue. Fast policy may also create a dependency upon imported 
policies and thereby deter policymakers from taking proactive steps to
address local climate and energy needs. Finally, fast policy may increase
the likelihood that a state’s imported policies will be struck down by courts. 
These risks, combined with the urgency of climate change, make careful
state policymaking increasingly important, particularly as the federal government
under the Trump Administration retreats from progressive climate mitigation 
efforts. 
1. The Complicated Web of Climate and Energy Policy 
Climate change mitigation and energy decarbonization pose some of 
the most complicated challenges facing our society. They both require a 
vast transformation of the status quo, which will disrupt investment-backed 
expectations of politically powerful entities, engendering strong, well-organized
opposition from incumbents.309 Beneficiaries, on the other hand, are diffuse
and not necessarily represented in the political process.310 Additionally, 
the grid and the atmosphere are not confined to traditional political boundaries,
making long-term negotiation and compromise necessary between neighbors
who may have vastly different political ideologies. Also, the relatively short 
election cycle does not lend itself well to solving problems with far off
benefits and immediate burdens.311 Further, because the solutions are
technical and complex, many of the fine details that have major impacts 
309. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1157 (2009). 
310. See Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to 
Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological 
Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 43–45 (2009). 
311. Lazarus, supra note 309, at 1167. 
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fail to arouse interest in the general public312 or are easily obfuscated 
through well-funded messaging campaigns.313 
The political landscape of each state is unique. Legislators have different
ideologies, agendas, and levels of sophistication about climate mitigation
and clean energy. Indeed, there is not even a consensus that climate change 
poses a threat to society and that a transition to renewables is necessary.314 
Administrative agencies have varying levels of funding and capacity to
implement programs and varying ability to withstand outside pressure 
from opponents of climate mitigation and clean energy.315 These differences
in state ideologies and capabilities impact the form of final legislation and 
the effectiveness of its implementation. Further, the administrative structure—
in which different agencies are tasked with specific problems, have different 
areas of expertise, and jurisdiction over a limited set of action areas—is
fundamentally at odds with a challenge like climate change that transcends
issue areas.316 
Climate change mitigation and a clean energy transition do not lend
themselves to a silver bullet solution. Some argue that attaching a price to
carbon through either a carbon tax or through cap-and-trade will internalize
the cost of carbon pollution and allow the market to properly incentivize 
the best solutions to the problem.317 While internalizing externalities would 
help, it would not be sufficient to realize the scope of changes necessary
to avoid climate disruption.318 Such a policy would do nothing to reduce the 
monopsony power of utilities, address land use and zoning impediments,
 312. See, e.g., Lori Bird et al., Impact of Rate Design Alternatives on Residential 
Solar Customer Bills: Increased Fixed Charges, Minimum Bills and Demand-Based Rates, 
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (2015), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/64850.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/54QF-9AZT]. 
313. Evan Lehmann, Free-Market and Pro-Fossil Fuel Groups Ally to Hold the Line
Against a Carbon Tax, E&E NEWS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/ 
stories/1059973001/ [https://perma.cc/DK5N-YLL9].
314. Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, The Politics of Climate, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 4, 2016),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/ [https://perma.cc/9G6K­
M554].
315. See, e.g., supra note 264 (discussing how the Oregon Global Warming Commission
had to fund-raise money because it lacked sufficient public funding). 
316. See generally Lazarus, supra note 309, at 1179–81 (discussing ecosystem problems 
that defy easy solutions).
317. Hannah Hess, GOP Statesmen Launch ‘Uphill Slog’ for Carbon Tax, E&E
NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/02/08/stories/1060049753 
[https://perma.cc/KVZ2-26JA]. 
318. Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q.
903, 938 (2011). 
 119




   
















   
 
 





POWERS2 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2017 11:04 AM 
reduce other direct and indirect subsidies to fossil fuels, ensure a diverse
portfolio of renewable energy technologies by location or technology type,
and would not contribute to ensuring a reliable grid capable of integrating 
high levels of renewables.319 Because there is no simple solution, legislatures
and agencies must grapple with the difficult task of addressing these interrelated
and complex issues, and they must do so in the context of highly charged 
special interests and inherent structural impediments discussed above. 
Not only is the regulatory landscape unique in each state, so is the pool
of market participants and the physical infrastructure that has been built 
over decades. Utilities differ in size, ownership type, and generation mixes.
Within generation mixes, each individual asset has different operating
characteristics and a different remaining useful life. In order to maximize 
efficiency, such fact-specific considerations regarding existing physical 
infrastructure must be examined and the extent to which existing infrastructure
can be repurposed for renewable energy technologies analyzed. For example, 
fossil fuel powered generating units may be in an area with a good solar 
or wind resource, but they also may not. If areas with good renewable
resources do not correspond with existing fossil fuel infrastructure, then 
either more infrastructure investments will be necessary to bring renewables 
online or perhaps more reliance on distributed generation would be more 
beneficial in such a state. For example, a lack of transmission capacity has
forestalled significant solar development in sunny eastern Oregon,320 while
the availability of transmission capacity along the Columbia Gorge helped
facilitate a boom in wind development.321 Details such as these have major 
impacts on the composition of the renewable energy industry in each state 
because they impact what types of generation are best suited for the
locality, which business models will succeed, and which resources will
need assistance to prosper. 
In sum, there is no plug-and-play solution for climate change mitigation
and clean energy development. Each regulatory landscape, the physical 
components of the grid in each state, and the marker participants are all
respectively distinct.  The barriers to a clean energy transition are diverse
enough that no single solution will overcome all the challenges. 
319. Id. (finding that a price on carbon would do nothing to reduce market barriers 
to entry nor regulatory barriers and would augment the risk of replacing a fossil fuel path 
dependency with a path dependency on just a few currently least cost renewables).
320. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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2. Failures to Identify and Address Underlying Problems 
Fast policy is not designed to identify and correct the underlying barriers 
impeding states from effective climate mitigation and energy decarbonization. 
Fast policy is premised on the idea that similar problems can be remedied 
by similar solutions. Fast policy therefore aims to remedy symptoms, rather
than to diagnose and remedy the underlying causes of a problem. Indeed,
if anything, fast policy assumes that states with similar problems have similar 
underlying causes. By presuming that the causes are the same, fast policy 
offers standardized remedies that are typically not tailored to a specific 
state. Although a state can of course tailor a fast policy to local circumstances, 
the mere act of importing the fast policy tends to limit the state’s ability
to accurately diagnose a problem. In other words, fast policy tends to create 
and reinforce cognitive biases that may undermine the discovery of effective 
policy solutions. 
Decision makers, like all humans, suffer from cognitive biases.322 Such
biases manifest differently under varying circumstances, but they are endemic
to the human condition. For example, cognitive biases likely contribute to 
medical misdiagnoses, because medical practitioners are trained to look 
for the most obvious explanations of medical problems.323 Once they identify
a potential cause, their brains tend to get stuck on that cause.324 Similarly, 
lawmakers also look for the obvious solutions, without undertaking a deeper 
analysis of underlying problems. Also, many lawmakers falsely presume
that humans are rational economic actors who will respond in predictable 
ways to market signals, despite ample evidence to the contrary.325 Overcoming 
these biases is possible, but it requires “a slow, deliberate, analytical and 
consciously effortful mode of reasoning about the world.”326 
In the arena of climate and energy policy reform, deliberative and analytical 
thinking are particularly important, because each state has different underlying 
322. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 142 (Kindle ed. 2016). 
323. See, e.g., Jerome Groopman, What’s the Trouble? How Doctors Think, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/29/whats-the-trouble [https:// 
perma.cc/QQB5-SPVJ].
324. Id. 
325. Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705 
(1998).
326. Jim Holt, Two Brains Running, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV. (Nov. 25, 2011) (reviewing 
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energy structures, needs, roadblocks, and remedies.327 In some states, 
adequate transmission capacity may impede integration of renewable
resources. In other states, the cost allocation methodology for transmission
access may be the primary roadblock. In some states, utilities may want 
to develop renewable resources but face regulatory barriers imposed by 
public utility commissions. In other states, utilities themselves may have 
erected barriers to limit competition from independent renewable producers.
Absent a deeper understanding of the impediments to effective climate 
change mitigation and energy decarbonization, policymakers who enact 
fast policies may be providing inadequate, incomplete, or irrelevant solutions 
to highly complex problems. For example, when Oregon imported its RPS, it
sought to support the development of new renewable energy resources, 
but it failed to recognize that the RPS would not encourage resource diversity
or geographic diversity.328 The resulting concentration of wind resources
now threatens the grid with potential instability.329 Worse than enacting 
inadequate solutions, as discussed next, fast policies may exacerbate climate 
change by offering poorly designed remedies that lock in new greenhouse
gas emissions. 
3. Path Dependency and Stranded Costs 
Poorly designed fast policy can create new path dependencies that 
undermine a state’s ability to achieve long-term greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions.330 In particular, near-term regulatory and market signals that 
promote lower-emitting, rather than zero-emitting, technologies can promote
investments in new infrastructure and technologies that help “lock in” 
fossil fuel emissions for decades to come.331 In the case of natural gas and 
corn ethanol, they may even promote the use of replacement fuels that 
actually increase lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions.332 Finally, short-
term signals supporting fossil fuels may spur investment in assets that are 
likely to become stranded.333 In an effort to avoid stranded costs, regulators
 327. See supra Section IV.
 328. See supra Part IV. 
329. Id.
 330. See Mormann, supra note 318, at 937–38. 
331. Hammond & Rossi, supra note 45, at 2; Gregory Unruh, Understanding Carbon
Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 817, 817 (2000).
332. See Melissa Powers, Lessons from U.S. Biofuels Policy: The Renewable Fuels 
Standard’s Rocky Ride, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF BIOFUELS (Yves Le Boutillier et. al. 
eds., 2016); Steve Weissman, Natural Gas as a Bridge Fuel: Measuring the Bridge, CTR.
FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 2–10 (Mar. 2016), https://energycenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/ 
nav/policy/research-and-reports/Natural_Gas_Bridge_Fuel.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY7Y-7X3M].
333.  Hammond & Rossi, supra note 45. 
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may allow fossil resources to stay online longer, to the detriment of the 
climate and carbon-free energy sources. 
Path dependencies already create significant challenges for regulators
trying to grapple with how the energy system will transition away from 
fossil fuels. The transportation and electricity sectors illustrate the challenges 
of overcoming path dependencies. Our roads and gas stations were built 
to accommodate gasoline-fueled vehicles, rather than electric vehicles.
Transitioning the vehicle fleet away from fossil resources will almost certainly
require passenger vehicles to become fully electric.334 Today, however,
most car buyers are wary of buying electric vehicles due to range anxiety335 
and a perception that they would be sacrificing significant convenience 
insofar as they would not be able to simply pull up to the nearest gas station. 
Thus, despite the increased availability of affordable electric vehicles,
petroleum-fueled vehicles comprise the vast majority of all new car sales.336 
Sales of new cars send market signals to companies to make new investments. 
More investments further reinforce the dominant paradigm and tell regulators 
to delay planning for an electric transportation system and to continue
investing in transportation resources that serve gasoline-powered cars.
Once along a path of fossil resources, the inertia makes breaking away
from the path extremely challenging, as facility designs, supply chains,
distribution systems, and customer expectations have solidified around a 
specific way of doing business.
The path dependencies in the electricity system are perhaps even more
challenging to disrupt, due to the monopolistic regulatory system that 
continues to dominate the United States’ electricity sector. The regulatory
system that applies to utilities (particularly those in the West, where most
utilities remain vertically integrated monopolies) encourages utilities to
continue using existing infrastructure as part of the typical “least-cost”
rate regulation model.337 Additionally, fears of losing their monopolies 
334. Bryan Lamble, Of Nesting Dolls and Trojan Horses: A Survey of Legal and Policy 
Issues Attendant to Vehicle-to-Grid Battery Electric Vehicles, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 193 (2011). 
335. Gary E. Marchant, Complexity and Anticipatory Socio-Behavioral Assessment 
of Government Attempts to Induce Clean Technologies, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1858, 1872–73
(2014).
336. See, e.g., Zachary Shahan, US Electric Cars Sales Up 44% In November —
1.1% Of US Car Sales!, CLEAN TECHNICA (Dec. 3, 2016), https://cleantechnica.com/2016/12/03/
us-electric-cars-sales-44-november-1-1-us-car-sales/ [https://perma.cc/DE3W-6UQL].
337. Fredrich Kahrl et al., The Future of Electricity Resource Planning, LAWRENCE
BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., 20–21, 27, 50 (2016), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl­
1006269.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SWH-M24H] (discussing how under the typical least-cost 
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through restructuring of the electricity market provide a disincentive for 
utilities to invest in transmission assets that could make electricity generation 
more competitive.338 To maintain their monopolies, utilities will typically not
seek to diversify electricity generation or provide alternative transmission
systems that could benefit renewable producers.339 Thus, path dependencies
in the electricity system create particular hurdles for climate change mitigation
and energy decarbonization. 
In addition, these dynamics can establish new path dependencies when 
utilities and regulators pursue incremental changes to the energy system,
such as when they replace a coal-fired power plant with a natural gas-fired
power plant located on the same site. Such a replacement is not unusual; 
Portland General Electric recently considered doing so for Oregon’s last
coal-fired power plant.340 Although using the same site may appear prudent 
because it will save the utility some costs such as land acquisition outlays
and money saved through the ability to repurpose some existing infrastructure,
any new investment in infrastructure will almost certainly lock in continued 
reliance on the new systems.  If the site had not previously supported
a natural gas facility, for example, the power plant will require access to
natural gas through pipelines and storage facilities. Once the natural gas 
infrastructure is built, it will be easier and more affordable for the utility
to build another natural gas-fired power plant in the same vicinity. Even 
if each new project requires some amount of additional investment, each
incremental investment will appear less expensive or risky than the
comprehensive infrastructure changes necessary to decarbonize the 
electricity grid. Policies that allow any investment in new fossil fuel
plants, such as Oregon’s RPS which allows fossil fuels to produce 50% or 
more of the state’s electricity even beyond 2040, risk enabling utilities to
become stuck on a fossil fuel-dependent future.341 
model, load growth historically drove investment in new facilities because existing facilities
could not provide enough capacity but that significant changes may require changing the 
overall model). 
338. See, e.g., Transmission: The Critical Link, Delivering the Promise of Industry 
Restructuring to Customers, NAT’L GRID 12 (2005), https://www9.nationalgridus.com/non_html/ 
transmission_critical_link.pdf [https://perma.cc/D57K-QD55] (discussing how regulated 
utilities lack an incentive to invest in transmission beyond what is necessary for their 
existing generators to reach their customers).
339. Matthew H. Brown & Richard P. Sedano, Electricity Transmission: A Primer, 
NAT’L COUNCIL ON ENERGY POL’Y 11–12 (2004), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/
DocumentsandMedia/primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QZU-UYLH] (explaining how the lack of
transmission availability creates “transmission constrained areas” which limit market
competition and deter market entrants).
340. See, e.g., Ted Sickinger, A gassy future? Debate rages over what replaces
PGE’s Boardman coal plant, OREGONIAN (Jan. 21, 2017), http://www.oregonlive.com/business/ 
index.ssf/2017/01/debate_heating_up_over_pges_re.html [https://perma.cc/LL67-74UD].
341. See supra Part IV. 
124
     
 
   
 











    
 
      








     
    
 
  
POWERS2 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2017 11:04 AM 
[VOL. 8:  67, 2016–17] Quick Fixes or Real Remedies? 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW
Finally, as new path dependencies develop, the risks of stranded costs
amplify, leading potentially to an even greater dependency on the existing
fossil fuel pathway. The regulatory system governing monopolistic electric 
utilities best illustrates this risk. Under traditional electricity law, electric 
utilities are entitled to earn a return that enables them to maintain financial 
integrity and attract capital investors.342 Regulatory theory states that this 
arrangement benefits both utilities, by allowing them to earn profits, and
ratepayers, who receive affordable electricity service due to the utilities’ 
lower cost of capital.343 When a utility makes an investment that later fails, 
the utility is not necessarily entitled to recover from the ratepayers.344 
However, if the utility and its investors alone pay the costs of failed
investments, the utility’s cost of capital will likely increase, leading to higher 
rates over time. Thus, it may make sense to charge the ratepayers for the 
failed investment—except that ratepayers loathe paying for utilities’ mistakes
and will often rebel politically when they do have to pay.345 Thus, when
faced with the options of (1) charging ratepayers for failed investments or 
(2) charging utilities and their investors, which will increase rates over
time anyway, regulators may look for a third option: keeping unwise
investments online and thereby avoiding stranded costs altogether. While
this third option may keep utilities and ratepayers satisfied, it can also
enable extended reliance on existing fossil resources that should otherwise 
go offline. Breaking free from the cycle of path dependencies and avoidance 
of stranded cost avoidance requires careful, long-term, and strategic planning 
that fast policymaking does not offer.346 
4. Policy Fatigue 
Fast policymaking can, in fact, exhaust political will and thereby
impede the type of careful and deliberative planning necessary for climate
mitigation and energy decarbonization. Fast climate and energy policies 
attract support in part because they often promise to provide silver bullet 
solutions. If lawmakers are asked time and again to revisit a problem that 
342. 
343. 
 Hammond & Rossi, supra note 45, at 8 n.36. 
Id. at 13. 
344. Id. at 8–9. 
345. See, e.g., Ed Joyce, Ratepayer Group: Proposed Settlement of San Onofre Nuclear
Costs ‘Theft’, SOUTHERN CAL. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/news/2014/
04/07/43257/ratepayer-group-proposed-settlement-of-san-onofre/ [https://perma.cc/9WFS-6AGV] 
(discussing one ratepayer activism battle over a failed nuclear investment in California).
346.  Hammond & Rossi, supra note 45.
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they thought they had solved and must enact round after round of incremental 
laws to address gaps or loopholes in the regulatory framework, they may
push back against the entire policymaking endeavor. This risk is particularly
high if some of the fast policies were controversial. To the extent fast
policies create a type of policy fatigue that deters lawmakers from pursuing 
more complex, yet more effective, climate and energy legislation, fast policy
can undermine the very objectives it seeks to promote. 
5. Increased Legal Risk 
Finally, while fast policies can help create legal certainty under some 
circumstances, they can also increase legal risks in others. As noted above, 
some states will benefit from legal decisions upholding climate and energy
laws enacted by early-moving states.347 Once a court upholds the law, importing
states will be able to rely on that decision in other legal challenges. The 
reverse, however, is also true: namely, if a state has imported a law from
another jurisdiction and a court later invalidates the original law, the importing 
state’s legal framework will also be at risk. Litigation challenging energy
and climate laws has accelerated across the United States, and some decisions 
from the Supreme Court and federal Circuit Courts have called into question 
the legality of some commonly transferred policies. For example, the Eight 
Circuit’s decision in North Dakota v. Heydinger348 raised the specter that 
other state laws restricting construction of and new long-term contacts with
coal-fired power plants could be invalidated under the Federal Power Act 
or dormant Commerce Clause. Federal courts have also split regarding the 
ability of states to protect utilities from the purchase mandate under PURPA,
raising questions about many state PURPA laws.349 Policy mobility has thus
made many state laws vulnerable to a domino effect if courts invalidate 
certain state laws. For states like Oregon that have imported dozens of climate
and energy policies,350 the risk of invalidation threatens much of the state’s
regulatory structure for the climate and energy sphere. 
Stacking the benefits of fast climate and energy policy against the risks 
suggests that fast policy may sometimes be better than nothing, but it may
also undermine climate change mitigation efforts by increasing reliance 
on newer sources of fossil fuels. Fast policy may also enable enactment
of simple and effective laws, but it will not promote the necessary structural
 347. See supra notes 287–97, and accompanying text. 
348. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 2016). 
349. Exelon Wind v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2014) (dismissing a challenge 
to Texas’ implementation of PURPA on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction); Allco Renewable Energy v. Mass. Elec. Co., 208 F. Supp. 3d 390, 398 (D. 
Mass. 2016) (finding the state’s rules invalid).
350. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
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changes that are essential to full energy decarbonization and meaningful
emissions reductions. In short, fast policy is not adequate to enable society
to address climate change. 
VI. GETTING OUT OF THE FAST LANE: RECOMMENDATIONS
 




As the need to reduce greenhouse gases becomes increasingly urgent,
climate and energy policies must become smarter, not faster.  Smarter
policymaking will require governments to undertake comprehensive assessments
of the existing impediments to climate change mitigation and energy
decarbonization. Smarter policymaking will then require governments to
develop, potentially from the ground-up, comprehensive solutions that
overcome the impediments. At the same time, smarter policymaking will 
require solutions that can both provide certainty, yet remain adaptable as
technologies accelerate and market dynamics shift. In short, smarter climate
and energy policy must be analytical, creative, deliberative, and adaptive.
To enable smarter climate and energy policy, state governments should
look closely at their own governance structures to ensure they have the 
capacity to engage in smart policymaking. In most cases, smart policies likely 
cannot originate from the legislative process, due to the lack of expertise 
in climate and energy policymaking within legislatures and the politicking 
necessary for specific climate and energy laws to pass. It would be better, 
therefore, for state legislatures to establish clear legislative mandates requiring 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions by specified deadlines and to delegate
to an expert agency the responsibility for devising a plan for achieving the 
mandates. Agency expertise is critical to this endeavor, and it may make
sense for the legislature to form a new agency structure to ensure that experts 
in multiple disciplines work together to chart a smarter climate and energy 
framework. 
Legislatures and advocates will undoubtedly continue to be tempted by 
fast policy solutions. Indeed, as the impacts of climate change become ever 
clearer and more immediate, a rush to the statehouse for one more silver 
bullet strategy will be hard to resist. Rather than expend political capital,
state resources, and precious time on more fast policies, however, it is time to
embrace a smarter and more deliberative approach to climate and energy
policymaking. 
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